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Abstract 
This paper applies an intuitive approach based on stock market data to a unique dataset of large 
concentrations during the period 1990-2002 to assess the effectiveness of European merger 
control. The basic idea is to relate announcement and decision abnormal returns. Under a set of 
four maintained assumptions, merger control might be interpreted to be effective if rents accruing 
due to the increased market power observed around the merger announcement are reversed by the 
antitrust decision, i.e. if there is a negative relation between announcement and decision abnormal 
returns. To clearly identify the events’ competitive effects, we explicitly control for the market 
expectation about the outcome of the merger control procedure and run several robustness checks 
to assess the role of our maintained assumptions. We find that only outright prohibitions 
completely reverse the rents measured around a merger’s announcement. On average, remedies 
seem to be only partially capable of reverting announcement abnormal returns. Yet they seem to be 
more effective when applied during the first rather than the second investigation phase and in 
subsamples where our assumptions are more likely to hold. Moreover, the European Commission 
appears to learn over time. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to provide econometric evidence on the effectiveness of merger control decisions 
in the European Union (EU). This seems to be both necessary and timely. From an academic 
perspective, there is a lively on-going discussion among antitrust scholars as to whether there is 
any need for a competition policy at all, as witnessed by the discussion spurred by Crandall and 
Winston’s (2003) and Baker’s (2003) papers. In particular, merger control institutions are 
repeatedly under criticism: they are ineffective and do not deter anticompetitive conduct (Crandall 
and Winston, 2003), they destroy synergistic efficiencies by unnecessarily intervening in the 
market place (Aktas, et al. 2004), are protectionist (Aktas et al., 2007), are relatively open to 
capture (Evans and Salinger, 2002), might not be the best instrument to prompt technological 
progress (Carlton and Gertner, 2003), or they are too lenient and allow anticompetitive mergers to 
go through (Kim and Singal, 1993).  
From the policy standpoint, throughout the last decade there has been a clear shift in 
merger control to consider remedies as a superior policy instrument if compared to outright 
prohibitions. Remedies are supposed to function as a surgery treatment in that they effectively 
tackle the market power concerns potentially raised by mergers without destroying efficiency 
enhancing synergies.1 In this instance, the European experience is enlightening. The European 
Commission cleared most of the over 4,200 notified mergers since 1990 without commitments 
(around 90%), as they presumably do not pose a threat to competition. Nonetheless, few major 
mergers have been completed without some conditions and obligations being offered by the parties 
and implemented by the agency, such as divestitures, provision of access, termination of 
agreements, or other behavioral requirements. More than 60% of phase 2 decisions were cleared 
compatible only with commitments; yet only 20 mergers were blocked between 1990 and 2009.2 
Moreover, significantly fewer proposed mergers have been blocked in recent years, following the 
overruling of three of the Commission’s prohibitions by the European Court of Justice 
(Airtours/First Choice; Schneider/Legrand; and Tetra Laval/Sidel), which were under the media 
spotlight and triggered major institutional changes in European antitrust.3 A similar evolution of 
merger policy is reflected in the American experience. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) have also been increasingly making use of remedies in merger 
                                                 
1
 This tendency in the policy arena is reflected by several recent reports on remedies by the world’s major antitrust 
jurisdictions (FTC, 1999; OFT, 2005; DG COMP, 2005) and international organizations (OECD, 2004), as well as the 
issuing of remedy guidelines (FTC, 1999; EC, 2001; DOJ, 2003). See Davies and Lyons (2007) for an excellent 
overview of the topic. 
2
 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf for constantly updated statistics on EU merger control. 
3
 These events made it very difficult for the Commission to block further mergers. Indeed, no merger was blocked in 
2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2009 and only one was blocked in 2004 and 2007, respectively. 
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control decisions during our sample period (see figure 1).4 However, unlike the European 
Commission, prohibitions have been intensively employed in the U.S., especially during the last 
three years of our sample. 
[figure 1 about here] 
Despite the economic importance and intense policy debate, there is almost no systematic 
econometric evidence on whether merger policy achieves what it is supposed to achieve, namely to 
“protect and restore effective competition”, nor on whether remedies are indeed the most 
appropriate instrument. We analyze the effects of merger control decisions using a sample of 151 
mergers scrutinized by the European Commission between 1990 and 2002. We use evidence from 
the stock markets as an independent and ex-ante assessment of the competitive consequences of 
the mergers and the EU Commission’s decisions. In the first step, we use a standard event study 
methodology to compute cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) around relevant events 
for both merging firms and for their rivals, which have been identified by the Commission itself 
and retrieved from its published files. Our starting point is that CAARs around the merger 
announcement should capture the merger’s competitive impact, while CAARs around the 
announcement of the Commission’s decision should measure the merger policy’s effects (e.g. 
Eckbo and Wier, 1985).  
Clearly, in order to make this inference, one has to account for the market expectations 
regarding the merger control procedure’s outcome. This is one of the first novelties of our 
approach, which we believe increases the reliability of CAARs as a measure of the competitive 
effect of a merger and a merger decision. We propose using the observable characteristics of a 
merger to estimate the probability of a particular antitrust intervention, and correct our profitability 
measures (i.e. CAARs) accordingly. In doing so, we must rely on the assumption that, on average, 
the market does not perfectly foresee the Commission’s decisions.5 
The final step constitutes the major innovation of our approach and lies in relating these 
expectation-corrected stock market reactions by using regression analysis to assess the 
effectiveness of merger control. The intuitive basic idea is that, under a set of assumptions that we 
thoroughly discuss, anticompetitive rents generated by the merger and measured around its 
                                                 
4
 We thank Joe Clougherty and Jo Seldeslachts for providing us with the U.S. data. While it seems that frequency of an 
action is higher in the EU than in the U.S., this is surely due to the kinds of mergers under scrutiny in the two 
jurisdictions. In the EU, only large mergers are notified to the Commission, the smaller ones being under the 
jurisdiction of the national authorities. Instead, the DOJ and FTC are in charge of all U.S. mergers which are above 
specific thresholds. 
5
 This seems a reasonable assumption supported by anecdotal evidence. On February 17, 2010, the DOJ approved the 
alliance between British Airways (BA) and American Airlines (AA), provided that the parties make four pairs of 
London Heathrow takeoff and landing slots available for up to 10 years to transatlantic competitors. The companies’ 
share price as well as that of their partners (Iberia and Finair) sharply increased. Reuters news agency stated: “Four 
daily slot pairs is better than analyst expectation of six and significantly better than the 32 that the alliance was asked 
to give up back in 2001, the last time BA/AA applied for immunity.” The market updated its belief about the 
profitability effect of the antitrust decision. 
  4
announcement should be dissipated by the antitrust authority decision, if this is effective. Hence, 
we expect a negative relation between decision CAARs and announcement CAARs. Additionally, 
the design of our test gives us a potential benchmark for a remedy’s effectiveness and, 
simultaneously, a robustness check for our approach: outright prohibitions should dissipate all 
rents that would have been generated by the merger and restore effective competition. Thus, we 
expect a coefficient of minus one in this case.  
Reassuringly, in all regressions and specifications, we get a negative coefficient in the case 
of prohibitions, which is almost never significantly different from minus one. Furthermore, our 
findings also suggest that remedies are on average only partially capable of reverting the rents 
generated around the merger announcement. According to our framework, we interpret this result 
as remedies not being able to solve anticompetitive concerns on average. Yet, we can qualify this 
finding. Remedies seem to be more effective when the anticompetitive concerns are not too severe, 
and when applied during the first rather than the second investigation phase. Moreover, the 
European Commission appears to learn over time, since remedies seem to be more effective when 
applied in “remedy-intensive” industries, i.e. industries where many remedies have been applied 
before.  
A set of four maintained assumptions are the foundation of our theoretical framework. To 
verify the validity of our inference, we present a large number of robustness checks, which should 
account for the potential failure of each of these assumptions. In particular, we assume that after 
correcting for the market expectations about the merger control procedure, rivals’ abnormal returns 
around the first rumor about the specific merger can be taken as an indication of the merger’s 
competitive effects.6 Being conscious that it might be restrictive to ignore that announcement 
effects intermingle other information, we are very careful to provide several pieces of evidence to 
                                                 
6
 The casual reading of the daily business press provides several examples in line with this main assumption. On 
November 12, 2009, two large mergers were announced of which commentators viewed one as clearly anticompetitive 
and the other as clearly pro-competitive. British Airways (BA) and Iberia announced a merger, whereby BA 
shareholders should end up with 55% and Iberia shareholders with 45% of the new company. The two companies 
would create the world's third largest airline by revenue after Air France-KLM and Lufthansa. The share prices of the 
involved companies and their rivals increased the days surrounding the announcement: BA's and Iberia's share prices 
rose by around 10% and 15%, respectively. Likewise, their main rivals shares' rose by around 7% (Lufthansa) and 6% 
(Air France-KLM), while the peer market indexes only rose by around 1% in that time period. Many commentators 
viewed this merger as being anticompetitive, mainly on the grounds that the Oneworld alliance (i.e. BA's alliance) 
already had a "tight grip" on the Heathrow airport, and the merger would make matters worse particularly concerning 
take-off and landing slots (see e.g. AFX News, November 13, 2009). The observed announcement “abnormal returns” 
are consistent with this interpretation. The same day, Hewlett-Packard (HP) announced the takeover of 3Com, paying 
a 40% premium over the pre-announcement share price. Despite that, HP shares also rose by around 2%, whereas the 
Dow Jones approximately remained flat. The deal was widely seen as being aimed at Cisco Systems, the leader in 
computer networking (see e.g. Jordan Robertson, November 12, 2009, AP Technology, "HP's 3Com takeover marks a 
shot at Cisco"), since the biggest companies that provide corporate computing infrastructure try to become "one-stop 
technology shops". Thus, 3Com assets are complementary to HP's and allow HP to offer more integrated solutions to 
customers. Cisco lost 2% in value on the day of the announcement of the deal, precisely in line with the idea that the 
stock market believed it to be a pro-competitive takeover. 
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support our results. Our main results are confirmed and reinforced in those subsamples, where our 
assumptions are more likely to hold. 
The approach based on stock market data, despite its difficulties, has several major 
advantages if compared to the use of other data sources. First and most notably, it allows one to 
disentangle the merger from the decision effects, whereas looking at the effects on firms’ 
accounting profits just allows one to measure the net effect. Second, it does not require one to 
define the time span along which the merger effects should be observed. Finally, it allows one to 
analyze blocking decisions and avoid a potential censoring problem due to the fact that the impact 
of a merger is only observed if the merger takes place. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a short overview of the literature on the 
assessment of competition policy. Section 3 briefly presents the institutional background of EU 
merger control. Section 4 discusses our main methodology, hypotheses, and maintained 
assumptions as well as robustness tests. In section 4, we introduce the data and some summary 
statistics, and section 5 presents our main results as well as our robustness checks. Section 6 sums 
up and concludes. Appendix 1 formally describes the event study methodology, Appendix 2 
explicitly spells out our approach to correct the profitability measures for the market expectations 
about the antitrust decision, and Appendix 3 provides a graphical exposition of our theoretical 
framework. 
2. Literature Review 
The evaluation of competition policy effectiveness has attracted academic and policy interest since 
the early 1970s. Earlier studies evaluated the ex-post effectiveness of merger control decisions and, 
in particular, ordered remedies in the USA using a case-by-case approach. Elzinga (1969), 
Pfunder, Plaine and Whittemore (1972) and Rogowsky (1986) use a methodology that is based on 
classifying ordered remedies as successful, sufficient, deficient, or unsuccessful depending on 
whether they fulfill certain criteria. While Elzinga (1969) argues that only one out of ten cases can 
be classified as successful or sufficient, the success rate in Rogowsky (1986) increases to 40%. 
 More recent analyses are reported in two studies commissioned by antitrust authorities of 
the U.S. and EU. The report commissioned by the FTC (1999) reviews 35 divestiture orders from 
1990 through 1994. Based on interviews, the study finds that most divestitures appear to have 
created viable competitors in the concerned market (28 out of 37). A higher percentage of 
divestitures (19 out of 22) were successful when they involved the sale of an entire ongoing 
business. The Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission also recently 
published an in-house study on merger remedies (DG Comp, 2005). It reviews the design and 
implementation of 85 different remedies adopted in 40 decisions by the European Commission 
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between 1996 and 2000. The analysis is also done by means of interviews with the committing 
parties or sellers, licensors and grantors, the purchasers or buyers, licensees and grantees and the 
trustees. More than half (57%) of the analyzed remedies were considered to have been effective, 
24% were only partially effective since they raised design or implementation issues that were not 
resolved during implementation, 7% were clearly “ineffective”, and 12% have been categorized as 
“unclear” remedies. Interestingly, phase 1 remedies were considered more effective than phase 2 
remedies. This may be due to the generally higher complexity of second phase cases. Phase 2 
investigations differ from phase 1 investigations in view of the drastically different timeframes 
involved (six weeks vs. four month) and that remedies proposed in phase 1 need to be clear-cut 
and straightforward. While certainly informative, the fact that these divestiture studies only use 
qualitative information (interviews) for a small number of cases limits their generality. 
Ellert (1976) is the first study that looks at the valuation effects of anti-merger complaints 
on firms’ stocks. He does not, however, consider the impact on rivals’ stock returns, which was 
first proposed by Eckbo (1983), Stillman (1983), and Eckbo and Wier (1985). Although they find 
significantly positive abnormal returns for rival firms, they argue that this positive valuation effect 
may be due to positive information released by the merger: the merger announcement is good news 
from the rival firms’ perspective, because it makes them (or the market) aware of real profit 
opportunities that were so far unknown. In particular, the paper by Eckbo and Wier (1985) makes 
the point that the only pattern consistent with a merger being anticompetitive is positive abnormal 
returns to rivals at a merger’s announcement and negative abnormal returns at the antitrust 
complaint. They do not find evidence for such patterns, and they therefore reject the collusion 
hypothesis in favor of their information hypothesis.7 While our approach makes use of the same 
kind of logic, we improve substantially on the identification issue as we explicitly relate 
announcement and decision abnormal returns by means of regressions to make more precise 
inference about the effectiveness of remedies. Moreover, different from these earlier studies, we 
also correct for the market expectations about the merger control inquiry, which improves the 
identification of the merger competitive effect. 
The papers most closely related to the present one, in terms of data and research focus, are 
probably Duso, Neven, and Röller (DNR, 2007), and Aktas et al. (2004, 2007). Using the same 
sample of EU mergers as utilized in this paper, DNR (2007) show that for at least half of the 
mergers rival firms benefit after the merger is announced, i.e. they can be considered to be 
                                                 
7
 These early studies have been challenged by McAfee and Williams (1988) and Werden and Williams (1989). They 
argue that the failure to detect market power may be due to rivals being large conglomerates that receive only a small 
portion of their profits from the relevant market. They also argue that the existence of effective merger control may 
have had a deterrent effect on certain types of attempted mergers, which cannot be measured with this methodology. 
Finally, they claim that event studies of individual mergers are unreliable because stock prices provide very noisy 
information about the collusive effects of mergers. Eckbo (1989) offers a rebuttal to most of these criticisms. 
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anticompetitive. By contrasting the markets’ reactions with the actual Commission’s decisions, 
they define type I errors (i.e. pro-competitive mergers blocked or modified by the authority) and 
type II errors (i.e. anticompetitive mergers unconditionally cleared). Using probit regressions, they 
show that procedural issues, market definition, as well as the merging firms’ country and industry 
of origin play crucial roles in predicting both kinds of errors, while lobbying activities by firms do 
not. The fact that the Commission made mistakes is a first hint about the potential “non-
effectiveness” of its policy. However, DNR (2007) did not look at the effects of the decisions. 
Hence, our study should be seen as the natural next step in understanding the effectiveness of EU 
merger policy. 
Aktas et al. (2004) look at 602 EU Commission decisions involving 1,070 firms and 
document significant abnormal returns for the target firms and smaller and less significant bidder 
abnormal returns. As does this paper, they also estimate abnormal stock price reactions to phase 1 
and phase 2 decisions, and find that outright prohibitions are associated with negative abnormal 
returns and approvals subject to conditions are relatively good news. However, they do not look at 
the effects on rival firms and they do not make inferences about the quality of antitrust. In a 
follow-up paper, Aktas et al. (2007) look more closely at the issue of whether the Commission 
decisions can be interpreted as being protectionist in the sense of protecting European firms from 
foreign competitors. They enlarge their previous dataset by estimating CAARs for rivals as well. 
Some of their results seem consistent with decisions increasing consumers’ surplus. Yet they find 
that the likelihood of an intervention by the EU Commission is higher when the merger is 
proposed by a bidder from outside the EU and has a negative effect on European rivals. They 
interpret this result as the European merger control being protectionist. Clearly, this paper focuses 
on one important yet very peculiar aspect of merger control. We therefore aim to provide a broader 
framework, which can be more generally used to evaluate the effectiveness of merger policy. 
To sum up, the evidence on merger control decisions is rather mixed. Studies of remedies 
in a case-by-case approach point to the superiority of structural over behavioral remedies, and 
possibly phase 1 over phase 2 remedies (DG Comp, 2005), but leave doubt about their general 
effectiveness. Theoretical arguments underline this conclusion.8  Most studies based on stock 
market reactions find positive effects of mergers for rival firms, yet the interpretation of this result 
differs. Some authors interpret this as being consistent with the information revelation hypothesis 
                                                 
8
 Motta, Polo, and Vasconcelos (2003) enumerate the pros and cons of the different kinds of remedies (i.e. structural 
and behavioral) used by the European Commission. While in principle they favor the use of structural remedies to 
clear problematic mergers, they also point to information asymmetries and incentive problems, as well as to the 
increased possibility of pro-collusive effects of divestitures. Davies and Lyons (2007), based on their empirical study 
using simulations, suggest that for global mergers behavioral remedies might be preferred in national markets 
especially when a national authority can monitor their application. Farrell (2003) argues that the effectiveness of 
structural remedies may suffer from inadequate buyers, "over" (or "miss"-) fixing and the discounting of merger 
efficiencies. Cabral (2003) instead supports the superiority of structural remedies. 
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(e.g. Eckbo, 1983; and Eckbo and Wier, 1985), while other authors interpret it as consistent with 
the market power hypothesis (e.g. Simpson, 2001; DNR, 2007). In what follows, we try to resolve 
these ambiguities. 
3. Institutional Features 
Merger control in the EU began with the European Communities Merger Regulation (ECMR), 
which came into force on September 21, 1990.9 According to the ECMR, a merger has community 
dimension, hence it is under the jurisdiction of the Commission, if “it takes place between firms 
with a combined worldwide turnover of at least 5 billion Euros and a turnover within the European 
Economic Area of more than 250 million Euros for each of at least two of the undertakings unless 
each undertaking achieves more than 2/3 of its aggregate Community turnover within one and the 
same member state.” This definition also includes mergers between firms that produce outside of 
Europe and sell in Europe. If necessary, a merger can be referred back to the member states for 
review. 
Art. 2(3) of the ECMR states that: “A concentration, which creates or strengthens a 
dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the 
common market or in a substantial part of it, shall be declared incompatible with the common 
market.” This is commonly referred to as the dominance test (DT). The DT constitutes an 
important difference to the SLC (Substantial lessening of competition) test, which is used by U.S. 
competition authorities. Some observers (e.g., Lyons, 2004) argue that the DT puts unnecessary 
weight on the concept of dominance in cases where the most important issue concerns the 
significant impediment of effective competition. The new merger regulation, which was applicable 
from May 1, 2004, focuses on a merger’s impact on competition. 
These regulations define the legal steps, which serve to control concentrations between 
undertakings (see figure 2), and which provide important dates for our event study. After receiving 
notification of the concentration, the Commission has 25 working days to assess whether the 
concentration is compatible with the common market (the phase 1). 
[figure 2 about here] 
The Commission can either clear the proposed concentration unconditionally (Art. 6.1.b), it 
can decide to let it go through after verifying that the commitments and obligations proposed by 
the undertakings can effectively restore competition (Art. 6.2), or it can decide that the proposed 
concentrations raise serious doubts as to their compatibility with the common market (Art. 6.1.c) 
and, therefore, a more in-depth analysis is needed (notice that the Commission cannot out-rightly 
                                                 
9
 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 was amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings that entered into force on January 20, 2004. Commission Regulation (EC) 
No.802/2004 implements the Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004.  
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block a merger after the phase 1 investigation). In this case, the Commission opens the so-called 
phase 2, which consists of 90 working days, during which an in-depth investigation is carried out. 
Generally, the Commission makes use of the entire available time, given the problematic nature of 
these cases, after which it has to come to a final decision: block the merger (Art. 8.3), let it through 
unconditionally, or clear it with commitments and obligations (Art. 8.2). 
Looking at figure 2, there are three events which are important for our empirical analysis. 
The first is the merger announcement, which we define as the first merger-specific rumors 
appearing in the press, and which should help us identify the market’s assessment of the merger’s 
competitive effects. The other two relevant events are the phase 1 and the phase 2 decision dates, 
which should help us identify the effect of the merger control procedure. 
4. Hypotheses, Methods, and Robustness Tests 
This section develops the core framework of our analysis. The central idea of this paper is that an 
effective merger control should dissipate anticompetitive rents generated by the merger. Therefore, 
merger control effectiveness can be assessed in several steps: (i) theoretically identify 
anticompetitive rents, (ii) empirically quantify the rents generated by mergers and merger control 
decisions, (iii) relate these measures by means of regression analysis to assess the extent of rent 
reversion achieved by different merger control tools.  
Next, we separately describe these steps, explicitly spell out the framework’s founding 
assumptions, and discuss our empirical predictions and how they might be affected if our 
maintained assumptions fail to hold. Throughout the paper, we assume that stock markets are 
efficient in a semi-strong form, i.e. that the prices of stocks reflect all publicly available 
information. We share this basic hypothesis with the entire literature using the event study 
methodology; hence we will not try to give an appraisal of this central assumption. 
4.1. Defining the Competitive Effects of Mergers 
Oligopoly theory (e.g. Stigler, 1950) predicts that when firms merge they potentially generate two 
externalities on rival firms: A positive externality due to the merger’s market power effect and a 
negative externality due to the potential efficiency gains generated by the merger. The first effect 
arises as post-merger there is one less firm in the market and, ceteris paribus, pricing will be less 
aggressive leading to higher prices and profits (“price umbrella”). In both standard Industrial 
Organization models of imperfect competition – Cournot and Bertrand with differentiated products 
– market output declines and prices rise absent efficiency gains (e.g. Salant et al., 1983, Deneckere 
and Davidson, 1985; and Farrell and Shapiro, 1990). Rival firms gain, as they do not bear the 
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quantity reduction of insiders and nevertheless benefit from the higher prices. 10 The second effect, 
higher efficiency, leads to lower prices, benefits insiders and consumers, while rival firms lose 
from fiercer competition. It is likely that in most mergers both effects are simultaneously present; 
we therefore look at the net effects. 11  Our first maintained assumption is: 
Assumption 1: Anticompetitive mergers generate a positive externality on rivals, i.e. an increase 
in rivals’ profits identify anticompetitive, i.e. consumer welfare decreasing, rents. 
Our identifying assumption, i.e. the relation between the increase in rivals’ profits and the decrease 
in consumer surplus (CS), is theoretically satisfied by many – but not all – oligopolistic 
environments. Our framework focuses on the Industrial Organization approach of unilateral effects 
in horizontal mergers in a static setting. There are situations in which the identification of changes 
in consumer surplus through changes in competitors’ profits may break down. For instance, in a 
dynamic context of sequential mergers (e.g. Nocke and Whinston, 2011), our identification would 
work only under certain conditions. In particular, whether of our assumption holds will crucially 
depend on the nature of the sequence of mergers.12 Second, the correspondence might also be lost 
in non-horizontal mergers, e.g. in a vertical merger consumers may be hurt as well as rivals if the 
merger forecloses competitors. Finally, the correspondence might be lost in the presence of strong 
agency problems, when mergers are undertaken for managerial reasons which contrast with profit 
maximization (see Gugler et al., 2003). 
Therefore, we expect our approach to be more appropriate for horizontal (rather than 
vertical or conglomerate) mergers, for mergers which do not come in an industry-specific wave 
and where the signaling of future industry-wide efficiency is less important, and for profitable 
(rather than unprofitable) mergers. We do not think that non-horizontal mergers are problematic 
for the present study, as most of the mergers in our sample have predominantly horizontal effects 
and would now fall under the "Horizontal Merger Guidelines". However, we add in all regressions 
a dummy that takes on the value of one in all those mergers, for which the Commission identified 
"vertical", "foreclosure", or "conglomerate" concerns. Moreover, to more directly address this 
issue, we run a robustness check, where we exclude all mergers that were not purely horizontal 
                                                 
10
 The papers by DNR (2007) and Gugler and Siebert (2007) provide a formal analysis of this point in a Cournot 
framework. They also prove that this theoretical identification also holds in Bertrand models of price competition and 
product differentiation.  
11
 In a Cournot setting and absent any efficiency gains, the merger is always profitable for the rivals, yet it is only 
profitable for the merging firms if they reach a large share of the market. This result is known as the merger paradox 
(Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds, 1983). However, if the merger achieves some cost savings for the merging parties, 
then also smaller mergers might become profitable (Farell and Shapiro, 1990). 
12
 Nocke and Whinston (2011) show that if a merger is CS-decreasing in isolation it remains CS-decreasing if another 
merger takes place that is CS-non-increasing in isolation. However, there might be situations where a CS-decreasing 
merger becomes CS-increasing conditional on a previous CS-non-decreasing merger occurring. 
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according to the Commission’s analysis. We next turn to measuring announcement and decision 
effects of mergers. 
4.2. Measur ing Announcement and Decision Effects 
The second step of our approach consists of choosing an empirical measure for the profit effects of 
a merger and the merger control decision. Following a long tradition in merger analysis starting 
with Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983), we use stock market reactions to the announcement of a 
merger and the merger decision to evaluate the impact of such events on merging firms’ and 
competitors’ profits.13 Though this approach to evaluate the competitive effect of a merger has the 
clear advantages that we discussed above it might be problematic. Indeed, the abnormal returns 
measured around the merger announcement potentially entail four major components: (i) The 
merger’s competitive effect (what we ought to measure), (ii) the effect of a shock that triggers the 
merger (the merger wave/future acquisition probability or in-play effect), (iii) the information 
about the allocation of the role in one particular merger (e.g. the out-of-play effect), and (iv) the 
market expectations about the outcome of the antitrust procedure. Our second maintained 
hypothesis is: 
Assumption 2: After correcting for the market expectations about the outcome of the antitrust 
inquiry, CAARs around the merger-specific first rumors measure the merger’s competitive effect. 
This is clearly our most crucial assumption and it needs further discussion. First, if markets are 
semi-strong efficient, they should account for the future antitrust decision when reacting to a 
merger announcement (e.g. Eckbo, 1992). One of the innovations of this paper is to develop a 
strategy to account for these expectations.14 In Appendix 2, we discuss our methodology to correct 
CAARs for the expectations about the Commission’s decision. In short, we assume that the market 
builds expectations on the possible antitrust decision based on the public information about the 
merger and the Commission’s records available in the market around the merger announcement. 
We quantify these expectations by estimating the probability of a particular decision as a function 
of the observable merger characteristics. We then correct our CAARs accordingly. The 
expectation-correction for the announcement CAARs make them a cleaner measure of the merger 
effect. The expectation-correction for the decision CAARs make them a clearer measure of the 
surprise entailed in the Commission’s decision and, hence, of its competitive effect. 
                                                 
13
 In Appendix 1 we shortly review this standard methodology. A discussion of the literature using event studies in 
merger analysis can be found in Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2007). 
14
 Our approach is also in line with existing studies in the finance and corporate finance literature, e.g. Malatesta and 
Thompson (1985) and Acharya (1993), which propose a similar methodology to deal with the issue of separating the 
economic effects from anticipation effects. 
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Second, we use the merger-specific first rumors in the business press as our measure for the 
merger announcement, since the surprise element to the stock market is likely to be largest around 
these dates and thus the merger’s effects are likely to be best measured.15 This procedure can be 
regarded as standard in the event study literature. For instance, Banerjee and Eckard (1998) 
suggest using the first rumors about the merger instead of official announcement dates in order to 
reduce the likelihood that the merger is already anticipated and thus that abnormal returns are 
biased towards zero. However, as pointed out by Fridolfsson and Stennek (2009), this approach 
might only be useful if there were no previous rumors of a possible merger in the industry when 
the allocation of the roles (acquirer, target, rival) was still uncertain.16 It may also be argued that 
rumors are more likely to intermingle effects, since they are closer in time to any market shocks 
that might have triggered the merger. Official announcement dates occur after rumors and are less 
likely to capture market shocks. However, if the allocation of role around the first rumors was 
uncertain, they might contain the additional effect coming from the resolution of this uncertainty 
(out-of-play effect). In any case, as a robustness check, we re-estimate our main equations using 
official announcement dates instead of dates of first rumors. 
Third, mergers might not be exogenous events but they might rather be triggered by market 
shocks, e.g. shocks in demand or costs (e.g. Mitchell and Mulherin 1996; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 
2002). If these market shocks are priced in rather than the competitive effects of the merger, we 
may mis-measure anti as well as pro-competitive rents. More in general, stock prices might also 
impound information effects. Early research (e.g. Eckbo, 1983) treated information effects vaguely 
simply positing that mergers signal positive information about an industry’s value, and/or potential 
synergies between rivals and subsequent bidders. Kim and Singal (1993) note that such an effect 
has largely been interpreted as signals that ‘rival firms are now more likely to be takeover targets’. 
Accordingly, more recent papers (e.g. Song and Walkling, 2000) concentrated on how mergers can 
convey whether rivals are more or less likely to be targets in the future. Moreover, such 
information effects will be moderated by where on the wave the event takes place (Akdogu et al., 
2005).17 In sum, an endogenous increase in future acquisition probabilities might influence our 
                                                 
15
 When we say merger-specific rumor we mean the first article in the press where both target and acquirer were 
mentioned. A typical example is the following. “Allied Signalsignal Inc., the diversified manufacturer, and Honeywell 
Inc., the maker of electronic controls, are in merger discussions, people close to the companies said yesterday.” The 
New York Times, 06/05/1999. 
16
 Quoting Fridolfsson and Stennek (2009): “The out-of-play effect crucially hinges on the assumption that the market 
anticipates a merger but is uncertain about the allocation of the roles of acquirer, target and outsider.” 
17
 Because of the increased merger activity levels associated with the pre-crest period of a merger wave, mergers 
occurring in this time-lap entail a higher probability of future acquisition for rivals (i.e. a larger information effect) 
than do mergers occurring in the post-crest period. Indeed, Song and Walkling (2000) focus on merger announcements 
in the pre-crest period as involving the greatest information effect. 
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measures of the rivals’ rents generated by the merger. Moreover, this information effect should 
increase at the beginning of a merger wave.18  
We propose several robustness checks for each of these criticisms. To control for the effect 
of an industry-wide shock, we first partition the sample into two time periods: 1990-1995 and 
1996-2002, during which a merger wave took place (see Gugler, Mueller, and Yurtoglu, 2006). 
One may be concerned that stock market reactions during this period were possibly unrelated to 
antitrust issues and mostly driven by economy-wide market shocks, such as the introduction of 
information technology that led to the dot-com stock market bubble in the late 1990s. Hence, we 
look at whether our results are consistent in this smaller, and potentially more problematic, 
subsample. If this is the case, then we might be less concerned that economy-wide merger waves 
strongly affect our findings. 
Second, we look at industry-specific rather than economy-wide shocks conditioning on 
future merger activity. In particular, we partition our sample between those industries (“inactive 
industries”) that display below median merger activity growth in the two years following a 
particular merger and those industries (“active industries”), which display above median merger 
activity growth in the two years following a merger.19 Our assumption 2 is more likely to hold in 
the inactive industries because endogenous increases in future acquisition probabilities should be 
less relevant. 
Third, we discriminate between mergers on the basis of the time span elapsed between first 
rumors and the starting of the EC reviewing process (notification). Mergers differ according to the 
"speed" with which they are completed, and it may be argued that the time-span between events 
matters for the assessment of a merger’s competitive effects. For example, CAARs for mergers 
that take a long time to be consummated after the first rumors may be contaminated by other 
events/shocks like uncertainty over the feasibility of the merger itself or, as we discussed above, a 
shock triggering the mergers. We expect assumption 2 to be more likely to hold for mergers that 
were speedily notified to the Commission, as stock markets may be more efficient at pricing in 
news when events are not too distant in time.20 
                                                 
18 Clougherty and Duso (2009), by using the same dataset as in this paper, observe that rival CAARs do not seem to be 
influenced by the merger wave, and therefore positive rival CAARs do not appear to be a function of a higher future 
acquisition probability. Similarly, Simpson (2001) uses an event study to analyze a merger among U.S. department 
stores. He finds positive abnormal returns to merging firms and their rivals, consistent with an increased concentration 
due to this merger. He shows that this pattern of abnormal returns seems to be better explained by the market power 
hypothesis rather than by the increased acquisition probability hypothesis. 
19
 To define these subsamples, we use the whole population of notified mergers in the time period between 1990 and 
2002 (more than 3,500) and define the industry according to the NACE codes used in the Commission’s decision. 
20
 We measure the "speediness" of the merger by the number of days between the first rumors and the official 
notification of the merger, and re-estimate our main results for rival firms for the subsamples of "speedy" versus 
"slow" mergers. "Speedy" ("slow") mergers are mergers for which the number of days between first rumors and 
notification is less (more) than the median number of days (55 days). 
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We now turn to the measurement of the effect of the Commission’s decision. We formulate 
the following: 
Assumption 3: After correcting for the market expectations about the outcome of the antitrust 
inquiry, CAARs around the Commission’s decision measure the profitability effects of this 
decision. 
First, we take the view that the Commission’s final decision, conditional on the information 
already available around the merger announcement, entails a surprise element. As shortly 
discussed in the introduction, several arguments and anecdotal evidence justify this approach. 
There should be some surprise element in the decision process of the Commission, otherwise the 
market would not significantly react to such news, which it however does. This surprise element 
can come from surprises in the decision-making process itself, or errors in the merger control 
procedure (DNR, 2007). Moreover, the fact that some announced mergers were later blocked by 
the Commission is indirect evidence that the decision process is not completely determined 
otherwise managers would probably not have announced these mergers in the first place. 
Second, we focus on the direct effect of merger policy, i.e. the effect of a particular 
decision on the market and the firms involved in that decision either as merging parties or as rivals. 
As pointed out by Sørgard (2009), an optimal merger policy also entails deterrence, i.e. the effect a 
decision has on firms’ future merger behavior. Indeed, Seldeslachts et al. (2009), by using a panel 
of antitrust jurisdictions over the period 1992-2003, find prohibitions to deter future merger 
activity, while remedies do not. 
Our correction for market expectations should at least partially control for this issue, 
because, by conditioning on the available information around the merger announcement, we try to 
insulate the pure surprise element for any specific decision. Yet, we also suggest using the history 
of past Commission decisions as a robustness test. Industries may differ in how the Commission 
handles them in merger control. The Commission may define problematic industries, because 
concentration is already high, e.g. telecommunications, or industries of “national interest”, e.g. 
energy. Thus, the Commission’s past decisions may convey important information on how this 
industry is treated or, put another way, the market can learn to better predict the Commission’s 
decisions in these industries. Also, the Commission may learn how to implement effective 
remedies in specific industries. Thus, we define “remedy-intensive” and “remedy-un-intensive” 
industries in the robustness section, and test for differential effectiveness of remedies.21 In remedy-
un-intensive industries, a decision to impose a remedy might entail a stronger signal about the 
                                                 
21
 Also in this case, we use the entire population of mergers notified to the EU Commission between 1990 and 2002 to 
make this classification. 
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Commission’s future behavior in that particular industry. This might make our inference 
potentially less accurate as in this case the effect measured around the decisions might also entail 
indirect effects. 
Finally, we believe that the market’s response to news can be appropriately measured 
because the timing of the decision is tightly regulated, as we discussed in Section 3. However, not 
all decisions are given before the official deadline. Hence, one might argue that the timing of the 
Commission’s decisions might itself be used by the market as a signaling device. For instance, a 
delay of the decision might signal that the Commission will be tougher than expected, while an 
earlier decision might come as a larger surprise to the market. Looking at the preliminary statistics, 
the average number of working days needed to come to a phase 1 decision after the merger 
notification is 27, which is quite close to the official deadline of 25 days. Similarly, for phase 2 
decisions the average time elapsed after the opening of the in-depth investigation phase is 89 
working days, which is quite close to the official 90 days fixed by the merger regulation.22 We 
therefore define “early” and “late” decisions. The former are cases where the Commission made its 
decision 5 (25) days before the deadline in phase 1 (phase 2), while the latter are cases where the 
decisions come 5 (10) days after the deadline in phase 1 (phase 2). As a robustness check, we run 
our regressions on the subsample of cases for which the decision did not come either too early or 
too late. For these cases, we expect the informative power of the expectation-corrected decision’s 
CAARs to be the highest and hence our assumption 3 to be more likely to hold. 
4.3. Effectiveness Assessment 
Ideally, an effective merger control policy should be able to maintain the benefits to consumers 
generated by increased efficiency and, at the same time, reduce the market power effects of the 
merger.23 This is particularly relevant for remedies which are supposed to cleanly separate these 
two effects. We therefore make the following simplifying assumption: 
Assumption 4: The market power effects generated by a merger ( MPR ) can be partially 
separated from its efficiency effects ( efficienciesR ). 
This assumption makes the analysis easier, yet we do not think it to be particularly restrictive. It is 
only needed in the case of remedies which are the sole instruments trying to separate these two 
effects. Moreover, even in this case, we only need the reduction of the market power effect due to 
the remedy to be larger than the potential reduction in efficiencies, which might also follow from 
                                                 
22
 In particular 89% of the phase 1 decisions come in the range between 5 days before and 5 days after the official 
deadline of 25 days after notification, while 85% of the phase 2 decisions come in the range between 15 days before 
and 10 days after the official 90 working days after the opening of the in-depth investigation. 
23
 This assumption is standard in merger models such as Farrell and Shapiro (1990), where the efficiency effects 
come from a marginal costs reduction achieved by the merging firms, while the market power effects come from the 
strategic reaction following the change in market structures determined by the merger. 
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the remedy. Since the ability to separate these two effects is likely to increase with the experience 
of the antitrust authority, we expect this assumption to more likely hold in remedy-intensive 
industries. Hence, the robustness check proposed above will also serve as a robustness check for 
this issue. 
The market power effect of a merger implies positive profits for both merging and rival 
firms, while the efficiency effect of a merger implies positive profits for the merging but negative 
profits for rival firms (Eckbo, 1983). Thus, if the action of the antitrust authority is effective, the 
decision-day abnormal returns of both merging and rival firms ( *DijR ) should be negative, since an 
effective decision wipes out the market power profits for both types of firms (Eckbo and Wier, 
1985). More importantly, however, they should be systematically negatively related to 
announcement period abnormal returns. The larger the market power effect of the merger and, 
thus, the larger the announcement period abnormal returns ( *AijR ) for both types of firms, the 
more rent reversion there should be if the antitrust action is effective. Our methodology does not 
simply rely on the sign of the decision CAARs, but rather on the effective rent reversion as 
captured by the relation between announcement and decision CAARs. 
We therefore propose assessing the "degree of effectiveness" of an antitrust action by 
running the following basic regression separately for merging firms and rivals: 
* *D A
ij idj idj ij i j ija b g X jR ? - R - -  (1) 
where subscript i denotes either merging (M) or rival (R) firms, and subscript j denotes the merger, 
which is our unit of observation. The subscript d represents the final Commission’s decision 
(C=clearance; O=other remedies;24 S=structural remedies; and B=blockings). Thus, we estimate 
different intercepts as well as slope coefficients for the four types of decision. The b-coefficients 
measure the degree of rent reversion due to the specific EU Commission’s decision. The variables 
contained in X are exogenous controls such as year and industry dummies and other merger-
specific characteristics. In the following, based on our maintained assumptions 1 to 4, we will 
discuss our hypotheses on the sign and size of the intercepts and slopes, which are then 
summarized in Table 1. Appendix 3 presents a graphical representation of our framework. 
[table 1 about here] 
Blockings. The most extreme action taken by the Commission, i.e. to block the merger, 
dissipates all rents, i.e. both the market power and the efficiency rents. Therefore, the null 
                                                 
24
 These are remedies that are not divestitures and which are mentioned in the Commission Notice on remedies 
(2001) (http://eurex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2001:068:0003:0011:EN:PDF). 
They are mainly behavioral commitments, e.g. terminating existing exclusive agreements, granting access to a 
necessary infrastructure, or licensing agreements. 
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hypothesis 1/?iBb  should not be rejected for both rivals (i=R) and merging firms (i=M): all rents 
generated by the merger are reversed by the final decision. Moreover, the regression line should 
pass through the origin: if there are no net rents generated by the merger, no rents are taken away 
by the decision, thus aiB=0. 
The failing of assumptions 1 and 4 should not affect these predictions, since prohibitions 
should revert any kind of rents generated by the merger, simply because they bring back the pre-
merger competitive situation. Hence, the nature of the rents (assumption 1) and their composition 
(assumption 4) should not matter, ceteris paribus. The failing of assumption 2 might instead bias 
our coefficient estimates. For instance, if our CAARs measured around the first rumor also capture 
the industry shock triggering the merger, then the biB coefficients might be smaller than one in 
absolute value. In fact, not all of the rents measured around the merger announcement can in this 
case be referred to the specific merger and, hence, reversed. If assumption 3 fails to hold, the 
decision to block the merger might also entail signaling effects on the companies’ market values 
not related to the specific deal. For example, the blocking decision could constitute a negative 
signal on the future possibilities to merge in the industry under scrutiny and thus depress share 
prices over and above the rents generated at the announcement. In this case, we would expect a 
negative coefficient aiB and/or a coefficient biB smaller than -1. 
Clearance. Under our maintained assumptions, if the merger is cleared without 
commitments, we do not expect decision effects that are systematically related to announcement 
returns, thus aiC,biC=0 for merging firms and rivals. This does not need to be the case if 
assumptions 2 or 3 fail. In this case, in fact, the CAARs might also signal other information. In 
particular, the reaction around the decision date might convey good news to the market about 
future mergers’ feasibility. In this case, we might then expect a positive slope for the rivals (bRC) if 
the clearing of the merger signals a green light from the Commission to mergers in that particular 
industry. This is even more likely if the Commission makes type II errors and unconditionally 
clears anticompetitive mergers. 
Remedies. The situation is more complex in the case of remedies (both structural and other 
remedies). Only market power rents measured around the merger announcement should be entirely 
dissipated by the antitrust decision if it is effective. Hence, each remedial action will entail a 
negative decision effect for merging firms and rivals. However, this effect will be differently 
captured in our regression for merging firms and rivals.  
For rivals, we expect a negative intercept (aRO < 0, aRS < 0) as well as a negative slope (bRO 
< 0, bRS < 0). The former captures the shift due to the elimination of the market power rents, while 
the latter indicates that rent reversion should be larger, the larger the size of the market power rents 
generated by the merger. For the merging firms, since both market power and efficiency effects are 
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positive, we only expect a negative slope (bMO < 0, bMS < 0), while we expect a zero intercept (aMO 
= 0, aMS = 0). 
Only in the case of remedies does assumption 4 play an important role, as they are the only 
antitrust instruments which aim to separate market power from efficiency rents. As already 
mentioned, this separability does not need to be complete for our methodology to work. With 
decreasing separability, however, we would expect both the intercept and the slope in the 
regression for the rivals (aRS, aRO, bRS, bRO) to be biased towards zero. Hence, whether we should 
interpret lack of significance in the coefficient estimates for remedies as a lack of effectiveness 
will ultimately rest on the interpretation of the source of separability. In particular, it will rest on 
the question of whether the two kinds of rents are indeed theoretically not separable – because the 
nature of a particular implication of the merger is such that both kinds of effects simultaneously 
appear – or whether the authority is not able to find a remedy apt to reach this separability.25 
4.4. Fur ther  Considerations 
Phase 1 vs. Phase 2. Mergers that are cleared with or without commitments in phase 1 and 
mergers that go into phase 2 might be quite different. For example, the ex-post evaluation study 
conducted by DG Comp (2005) finds that remedies are mostly effective in phase 1. One of the 
reasons might be that these cases are simpler to fix, remedies in this investigation phase must be 
clear-cut and easy to implement, and the Commission has a stronger bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
merging firms through the credible threat of opening a costly phase 2 investigation. We shall test 
for differences in the remedies’ effectiveness depending on whether the case was decided in phase 
1 or phase 2. 
Pro vs. Anticompetitive Mergers. The antitrust agency could wrongly intervene against pro-
competitive mergers (type I errors) or approve anticompetitive mergers without remedying them 
(type II errors). We follow DNR (2007), and use rivals’ merger announcement effects to measure 
anticompetitiveness. Under a consumer welfare standard, we can then define a merger to be 
anticompetitive (i.e. consumer’s surplus reducing) if it increases competitors’ profits, i.e. if 
0@R ARj , and procompetitive if it reduces competitors’ profits, i.e. if 0@R ARj . In the empirical 
section, we shall run regressions testing for the robustness of our results and discriminate between 
pro and anticompetitive mergers.26 This will also allow us to analyze whether merger control 
average effectiveness is affected by the mistakes made by the Commission. 
                                                 
25
 For example, the closing of a branch of a bank due to a merger, might simultaneously have procompetitive effects 
(e.g. increase efficiencies by reducing duplication) and anticompetitive effects (e.g. reducing the number of local 
competitors). Eventually, no kind of action taken by the antitrust authority can separate these two effects.  
26
 Fee and Thomas (2004) and Shahrur (2005) propose using information on corporate customers to refine the Eckbo 
and Stillman methodology adopted by DNR (2007). This approach, which surely would substantially improve the 
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5. The Data and the Estimated Abnormal Returns 
Our sample consists of 151 concentrations in the period 1990-2002 that have been analyzed by the 
European Commission. Our starting database was developed in DNR (2007). Our sample includes 
almost all phase 2 mergers scrutinized by the EC till the end of 2001, and a randomly drawn 
sample of phase 1 cases which run up to June 2002. Because of difficulties in identifying 
competitors or their stock, we end up with 71 phase 2 cases and 80 phase 1 cases for which we 
have complete information. We identify 544 different firms involved in the mergers either as 
merging parties or as rivals. 
Merging firms and competitors are identified from the publicly available Commission’s 
decisions.27 This is one of the big advantages of our dataset, since we can rely on the 
Commission’s analysis concerning the market definition (i.e. the relevant competitors).28 
Furthermore, the Commission’s reports also provide in-depth information about the characteristics 
of the mergers and decisions, such as the kind of concentration (e.g. full versus partial merger), the 
nature of the merger (pure horizontal vs. horizontal with conglomerate/vertical effects), the 
involved product and geographical markets, the kind of remedies imposed, the provenience of the 
involved firms, etc. 
The merger announcement dates are collected from the financial press by using the Dow 
Jones Interactive database. This is a customizable business news and research product that 
integrates contents from newspapers, newswires, journals, research reports, and web sites. We look 
at the first rumors about the merger, i.e. the first time a discussion of the merger appears in the 
international press, but provide robustness checks using official announcement dates.29 This has 
the advantage of reducing the noise in identifying the “right” event. Finally, we collect data on 
firms’ stock prices and market values as well as market indexes, as defined by each firm’s country-
industry sector, by using Thomson Financial’s Datastream. 
Table 2 presents a short description of the relevant variables. The market value of the 
combined firms (rivals) is on average 45 (7.5) billion U.S. dollars. On average, the Commission 
reports 7.6 rival firms, and we were able to find stock market information for 62.5% of them. The 
majority of the concentrations in our sample (57.1%) were full mergers, 24% joint ventures, 13.1% 
                                                                                                                                                                
identification of anticompetitive mergers, has the major drawback that, for many transactions, it is not possible to 
define customers that are quoted firms. 
27
 The reports for each of the Commission’s decisions can be downloaded from the Commission’s webpage:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/. 
28
 In the existing literature, in fact, rivals are defined as all other firms in the industry, however, antitrust markets are 
generally fairly different from an industry. Therefore, we can significantly reduce the measurement error due to a too 
broad market definition, which would bias the competitors’ abnormal return towards zero. This point was already put 
forward by Eckbo and Wier (1985). 
29
 These are taken from the SDC database (Thomson Reuters). 
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partial acquisitions, 11.3% tender offers, and only 6% consisted of asset acquisitions. In 41.1% of 
the cases the geographical market definition is the European Economic Area, in 35.1% it was 
defined to be national, in 21% it was worldwide, and in a few cases it was left open because the 
geographical market definition was not relevant for the decision. 
Remedies have been imposed in 35.1% of the mergers (12.2% of phase 1 and 78% of phase 
2 mergers), and 7.7% were blocked. Hence, in 42.8% of the cases in our sample the Commission 
took an action, i.e. intervened to modify or block the merger. Remedies are categorized as 
structural or behavioral using the information contained in the Commission’s decision. In 23.5% of 
the cases the Commission ordered a divestiture, while in 11.8% it imposed other kinds of 
remedies. 
[table 2 about here] 
Table 3 reports statistics on the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) around 
various events using different event windows for merging firms and competitors. We consider a 
short window from 5 days before to 5 days after the relevant event, and a long window that goes 
back 50 days before the event to 5 days after. 
[table 3 about here] 
The mergers in our sample were on average “profitable” since the CAARs for the merging 
firms around the announcement date are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for all 
used windows. The size of the effects ranges from 1.05% in the short window to 1.8% in the long 
window. This result seems to be in line with the literature.30 The cumulative abnormal returns for 
the rivals around the announcement date are, instead, not statistically significantly different from 
zero and, on average, small in size. Looking at phase 1 decisions, we observe negative CAARs for 
the merging firms as well as for the rivals. The negative effect stems mainly from those cases 
where a phase 2 investigation was opened: The negative CAARs for the merging firms in that case 
are on average -1.7% in the short window and -1.4% in the long window. Similarly, rivals lose 
from the opening of a phase 2 investigation (in the long window up to -1.1%). For phase 2 
decisions, almost all CAARs are statistically insignificant. 
6. Results 
6.1. The Probability of an Action 
As discussed in section 4 and in Appendix 2, our first step is to estimate the probability that the 
Commission takes an action. The dependent variable is a dummy (ACTION) equal to 0 in the case 
                                                 
30
 See for instance Andrade et al. (2001). Depending on the event window, we estimate average abnormal returns for 
acquirers in the range between -0.54% and 0.12% (not statistically significantly different from zero) and for the targets 
in the range between 3.4% and 6.2% (statistically significantly greater than zero at the 1% level). These results are 
quite similar to those reported by Aktas et al. (2004) using a comparable sample of mergers. 
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of outright clearance and equal to 1 in the case of remedies or prohibitions. Table 4 reports the 
estimation results. The probability of an action is explained by several observable merger 
characteristics proxying for the merger’s likely (anti) competitive effects, firms’ lobbying, and/or 
protectionist tendencies of the antitrust agency: whether one or both of the merging firms stem 
from the USA (us), whether one or both of the merging firms stem from a major EU country 
(bigeu; France, Germany, Italy, Spain, or UK), whether conglomerate or vertical concerns have 
been identified (conglom), whether the merger is a cross border deal (crossbord), whether the EU 
Commission defines the relevant geographic market as worldwide (world), EU wide (eu) or 
national (reference group), whether the merger is a full merger (full; as opposed to partial 
acquisitions), the size of merging and rival firms measured by the logarithm of their market values 
(lnvm and lnvr respectively), industry indicators (d for manufacturing and i for communications) 
and time variables (time trend and a dummy for the late years 1995–2002).31 
[table 4 about here] 
The probability of an action is significantly lower if one or both of the merging firms stem 
from the USA32 or if markets are defined as EU-wide. It significantly increases with the presence 
of conglomerate or vertical concerns,33 the size of rival firms, if the firms operate in 
manufacturing, and during the last years of the sample (1995–2002). We correctly classify around 
70% of the observations. From the reported estimates, we predict for each merger the probability 
of an action conditional on the public information available at the announcement date 
( ] _AIactionPr ), and correct the estimated CAARs around the merger and decision announcements 
by the predicted probabilities according to the discussion highlighted in Appendix 2. We run 
regression (1) using the probability corrected CAARs. 
6.2. Main Results 
Table 5 presents our main regression results. We choose the long window (-50, +5) to measure the 
merger’s effect around its announcement, the short window (-5, +5) around phase 1 decisions, and 
again the long window (-50, +5) around phase 2 decisions. These strike us to be the best choices to 
account for information leakages.34  
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 This dummy captures the years during which Mario Monti was the Competition Commissioner and several changes 
in merger control enforcement happened. These industry and time effects should also capture the learning process 
undergone by firms and investors about the Commission’s decision. Indeed, it might be easier for the market to build 
expectations about a specific decision in late years and in industries where the Commission was more active. 
32
 Note that this result seems to contrast with the findings of Aktas et al. (2007), who claim that EU merger control is 
protectionist and favors European firms. 
33
 A merger is defined to also have conglomerate or vertical (foreclosure) effects if the Commission stated so in its 
reports. 
34
 Before the phase 1 decision, one should not expect much outflow of information as this investigation phase spans 
over a quite short time period, which is mostly used for administrative and procedural issues. Instead, information 
leakages might be an issue during phase 2, since this in-depth investigation lasts several months and attracts more 
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In all specifications we control for time as well as industry effects (manufacturing and 
communications). This might capture aggregate or industry specific shocks, which might affect the 
decision CAARs. We also add a dummy equal to one for those cases where conglomerate and/or 
foreclosure aspects were identified by the Commission (i.e. not purely horizontal mergers). 
Finally, we control for the percentage of rivals identified by the Commission, for which we were 
able to get stock market information to control for possible measurement errors due to a potentially 
incomplete covering of the market. 
[table 5 about here] 
Our first important findings are the significantly negative coefficients biB for outright 
blockings (bRB=-0.88 for rivals and bMB=-0.72 for merging firms), which are not statistically 
significantly different from minus one for rivals. Prohibitions seem to fully restore the pre-merger 
competitive situation and can be interpreted to be an effective merger control tool, according to our 
theoretical framework. The significantly negative intercept term for merging firms when the 
merger is blocked can be explained by additional costs (in addition to the lost market power and 
efficiency rents) of a blocked merger. These involve the direct costs of the lost merger proceedings 
and, probably more importantly, the indirect costs of the need to establish a new merger or 
business strategy. Hence, the fact that bMB is not significantly smaller than minus one as well as the 
significantly negative constant for merging firm (aMB) in the case of blockings might be explained 
with the CAARs entailing other signals such as the shock triggering the merger or the cost of the 
merger procedure itself. 
 Clearances do not have a positive effect on firms as witnessed by the zero intercepts, which 
is consistent with our hypotheses. However, the positive and significant estimate of the slope for 
rivals (bRC) implies that their gains after an outright clearance increase with the size of their 
announcement gains, which we interpret as a possible measure of anticompetitiveness. The 
absence of an action by the antitrust authority conveys positive news to the market that future 
(possibly anticompetitive) mergers are feasible without provoking prolonged merger proceedings. 
This result might suggest that, on average, our assumption 3 for clearances is too restrictive. We, 
however, favor an alternative interpretation, i.e. the market evaluating the cost of a type I error: the 
more anticompetitive the deal is (i.e. the larger the rivals’ rents at announcement), the more rivals 
                                                                                                                                                                
public attention than phase 1. Moreover, the Commission might provide some information to the market by applying 
the so-called “market test”, which asks competitors and customers to evaluate the proposed conditions. For further 
evidence supporting our choices also see Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2007). Duso, Gugler and Yurtoglu, (2010), 
using a subsample of the mergers used in this paper, show that the correlation between CAARs and ex-post merger 
profitability measures based on accounting data is the highest for larger event windows.  Moreover, Fridolfsson and 
Stennek (2009) give a theoretical rationale for preferring long windows. Finally, we run our main regressions using 
shorter windows and our qualitative results are not substantially altered.  
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profit from an outright clearance. Indeed, our next extension that looks at differences between anti 
and pro-competitive mergers (table 7) is in line with this interpretation. 
 The coefficient estimates for remedies are only partly in line with the predictions for an 
effective merger control. In particular, the predicted negative shift for rivals is not observed, since 
the estimated intercepts (aiO, aiS for i=M,R) are not significantly different from zero. Yet, given the 
small coefficient estimates and the relatively large standard errors, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
of these coefficients being smaller than zero. The coefficient estimates for the slopes are negative 
for both rivals and merging firms (biO, biS for i=M,R), and for the latter they are significantly 
different from zero. For rivals, we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are negative, given the 
large standard errors. We interpret the negative estimates for the slopes as partial rent reversion 
and, hence, partial effectiveness of remedies. 
To wrap up, the main results using the full sample are the following: 1) prohibitions 
achieve full rent reversion; 2) remedies achieve only partial rent reversion; 3) clearances increase 
rents for rivals and the larger the merger effect at announcement the more they do so. Our 
interpretation of these findings in terms of merger policy effectiveness is as follows: 1) 
prohibitions are an effective merger control tool; 2) remedies are only partially effective; and 3) 
some outright clearances might indeed be type II errors of the Commission. 
6.3. Additional Results  
We next analyze phase 1 and phase 2 decisions (subsamples) separately in table 6. For cases closed 
after a phase 1 investigation, we observe significant rent reversion in case of remedies for rival 
firms (bRR=-0.19), even if the intercept (aRR) is not significantly different form zero.35 This again 
can be seen as consistent with remedies being, though only partially, effective in reverting market 
power rents when they are applied in phase 1, and it is in line with the findings by the 
Commission’s in-house study (DG Comp, 2005). Similarly to the full sample, the intercept and 
slope coefficients for rivals (bRC) in mergers that were out-rightly cleared are significantly positive. 
Again, one can interpret this finding as the cost of a type II error: some mergers with 
anticompetitive effects are cleared after a short investigation phase. This result is consistent with 
DNR (2007), who show that the probability of a type II error significantly increases in phase I. 
[table 6 about here]  
The regressions run on the phase 2 subsample almost entirely replicate (and reinforce) the 
results observed in the full sample. Again, the consistency check for our procedure is successful, as 
the estimates for the blocking slopes (biB) are not significantly different from minus one. This is 
true not only for rivals but also for merging firms. Consistent with our predictions, the intercepts 
                                                 
35
 Due to the limited number of observations, we do not discriminate between structural and behavioral remedies. 
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for blockings (aiB) are not significantly different from zero for both merging firms and rivals. 
Furthermore, our hypotheses for out-rightly cleared mergers are also met for both merging firms 
and rivals, as the slopes (biC) as well as the intercepts (aiC) are not significantly different from zero. 
We interpret this result as showing that it is less likely that a type II error is made after an in-depth 
investigation. 
The major discrepancy is on the slopes for remedies. Now, the slope coefficient for 
structural remedies is estimated to be significantly positive for rivals (bRS) and significantly 
negative for merging firms (bMS). Our interpretation for this finding is that these possibly more 
complex remedies might merely result in rent transfers from merging firms to their rivals without 
correcting the anticompetitive nature of the merger. This interpretation seems intuitive: if the 
divested assets are purchased by existing competitors at below market prices (because there is time 
pressure and the Commission must agree to the identity of the buyer), rivals gain but effective 
competition might not be fully restored. This interpretation of our findings would imply that 
remedies in phase 2 are less of an effective merger control tool, on average. 
The second extension consists of estimating different intercepts (aid) and slopes (bid) 
differentiating between anticompetitive (rival announcement CAARs = 0@R ARj ) vs. pro-
competitive (rival announcement CAARs = 0>R ARj ) mergers (see table 7).36  
[table 7 about here]   
Our main results carry over in that outright prohibitions exhibit full rent reversion (i.e. biB 
is not significantly different from -1) and remedies are only partially effective. In particular, 
remedies in anticompetitive mergers have a strong and significantly negative effect on rivals (bRR 
for anticompetitive mergers), while, in the case of merging firms, a negative and significant effect 
(bMR for pro-competitive mergers) is observed when remedies are applied to pro-competitive 
mergers. This might point to costs for merging firms when a type I error occurs and the authority 
erroneously intervenes in a pro-competitive merger. 
Finally, the clearance of an anticompetitive merger increases the rents earned by rivals (bRC 
for anticompetitive mergers is positive), while not significantly influencing the merging firms: 
This kind of type II error (no remedies in anticompetitive mergers) seems to benefit the 
competitors without hurting the merging firms. Therefore, the positive slope for clearance, rather 
than to be understood as the failing of our assumption 3, seems to be consistent with the market 
correctly evaluating the effects of the Commission’s mistakes.  
6.4 Robustness Checks Against the Failing of Our  Assumptions 
                                                 
36
 Data limitations do not allow us to separately estimate the effect of prohibitions (BLOCK) for pro and 
anticompetitive mergers. 
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In this section we discuss the robustness checks proposed in section 4.3 to account for the possible 
failure of our assumptions. 
 
6.4.1. Purely Hor izontal Mergers 
Table 8 presents the estimates for our main regressions using the subsample of purely horizontal 
mergers (85% of the sample). These are mergers where the EU Commission did not identify any 
conglomerate or vertical effects. Our assumption 1 should be more likely to hold for these mergers. 
For this subsample, most of our main findings carry over with comparable significance levels. The 
coefficients on blocked mergers are again not significantly different from minus one for rivals 
(bRB), and smaller than minus one for merging firms (bMB). Again, the effectiveness of remedies is 
only partially corroborated. Different from the full sample, the slope coefficient on other remedies 
(bMO) for the merging firms is estimated to be significantly negative and that for rivals (bRO) to be 
significantly positive. The interpretation we offer for this finding is that behavioral remedies in 
horizontal mergers would be a rent transfer from the merging firms to their competitors. 
[table 8 about here] 
6.4.2. Official Announcement Dates 
For our main estimations, the merger-specific first rumors are used as the merger announcement 
dates. Although this procedure can be seen as the standard in the literature, it may be argued that 
rumors are more likely to intermingle other effects, such as market shocks triggering the merger. 
This problem should be less severe at the official announcement dates at the cost that mergers 
might already be anticipated and measured effects are likely to be biased towards zero. We were 
able to obtain the announcement dates from the SDC database (Thomson Reuters) for a subsample 
of 120 out of our 151 mergers. A comparison of these two different sources of data reveals a fairly 
strong overlap for most of the events. However, there were also some events for which the date of 
the first rumor was substantially earlier than the announcement dates in the SDC database. Hence, 
as a first robustness check for our assumption 2, we run the basic regression using this alternative 
event for the merger announcement. 
[table 9 about here] 
Results are very comparable to those obtained with our preferred definition of the merger 
announcement. We still cannot reject the hypothesis biB =-1 (i=M,R) for both merging and rival 
firms. The intercepts for structural and other remedies (aMS, aMO) are negative for merging firms, 
while only the latter (aRO) is negative for rivals and the former (aRS) is positive. In all these cases, 
we cannot reject our hypotheses of these intercepts being negative. Both slopes for structural 
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remedies are negative for merging firms and rivals (bMS, bRS), while both slopes for other remedies 
are positive (bMO, bRO). These results are again only partially consistent with remedies being 
capable of reverting rents measured at the merger announcement. Also in this case, we observe 
positive and significant reactions (i.e. both constant aRC and slope bRC) for clearances for rivals. 
6.4.3. Post 1996 – The Merger  Wave 
Our sample period, 1990–2002, saw huge speculative stock price appreciations with a 
commensurate merger wave in the second half of the 1990s. The following robustness check for 
assumption 2 consists of controlling for this economy-wide merger wave. We split the sample into 
a pre-1996 period (1990–1995) and a post-1996 (1996–2002) period, for which we present the 
results in table 10. 
[table 10 about here] 
Our results are robust to merger wave arguments. We still cannot reject the hypothesis bRB = -1, 
and the estimated slope for merging firms is just a bit smaller than in the full sample (bMB=-0.67). 
Hence, the potential bias in our main findings seems to be quite limited. On remedy effectiveness, 
we obtain very similar results as in the full sample: remedies are only partially effective in 
reverting announcement rents. Moreover, the coefficient for structural remedies might again be 
interpreted to be consistent with a rent transfer from merging firms (bMS=-0.185 and significant) to 
rivals, for which the slope coefficient is positive (bRS=0.395) and significant. 
6.4.4. Future Merger  Activity 
We next re-estimate our main equation for the two subsamples “inactive” vs. “active” industries to 
control for industry-specific merger waves. This set of results should provide a robustness check 
for the failure of assumptions 1 and 2. Table 11 presents the results. 
[table 11 about here] 
 Our main findings for the two subsamples are qualitatively similar, yet some differences 
also emerge. The slopes for blocking (biB) are not significantly different from minus one in both 
subsamples, although the magnitudes of the point estimates are reduced particularly in the 
“inactive” subsample.37 Remedies appear to be only partially effective, as the slopes for both 
remedy types, in both subsamples, are negative for merging firms (bMO, bMS) and, apart of 
behavioral remedies, also for rivals (bRO). Again, clearances are greeted with a positive share price 
reaction in both subsamples for both rivals and merging firms (aiC). In sum, while we cannot rule 
out the possibility that announced mergers endogenously increase future merger activity in 
                                                 
37
 Moreover, in the “inactive” subsample we also estimate a positive intercept for rivals in the case of prohibitions 
(aRB). If outside the wave (“inactive” industries) mergers are on average more efficient (e.g Gugler at al, 2003), this 
might be interpreted as the cost of a type I error: the Commission blocks a pro-competitive merger and, therefore, 
favors the rivals.  
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particular industries (i.e. the “active” industries), the relation between decision and announcement 
CAARs does not appear to be affected.  
 
6.4.5. Time Between First Rumors and Notification 
The speed with which mergers are completed differs across mergers, and the time spans between 
events might matter for the assessment of competitive effects. The larger the time span between 
the first rumor and the official notification, the more likely our CAARs can be contaminated by 
other sources of uncertainty about the merger and, therefore, the more likely it is that our 
assumption 2 does not hold. We therefore differentiate between “slow” and “speedy” mergers and 
report the results for the two subsamples in table 12. 
[table 12 about here] 
 As expected, results for “speedy” mergers are much more in line with our predictions. The 
coefficient on blockings for rivals is bRB=-1.03 and not significantly different from minus one 
confirming full rent reversion after a merger is blocked. For merging firms, the slope on blockings 
bMB is -2.22, yet quite imprecisely estimated. In “the “slow” mergers subsample the slope on 
blockings for rivals (bRB) is negative but not significantly different from minus one. This may be 
attributable to the longer time span between first rumors and notification, and the implied 
measurement errors. The results on remedies are quite similar to those observed in the full sample, 
although there is more rent reversion in the subsample of “speedy” mergers for merging firms. 
This robustness check essentially shows that reducing measurement errors, i.e. making it more 
likely that our assumption 2 holds, moves the empirical findings closer to the predictions of our 
framework. 
6.4.6. Remedy Intensive Industr ies 
The Commission’s past decisions are important for a number of reasons. First, besides intrinsic 
characteristics such as merger intensity or growth, industries may differ in how the antitrust 
authority treats them. Second, the Commission’s past decisions may convey important information 
to the market with respect to future decisions. Hence, the signal-to-noise ratios of our measured 
abnormal returns may vary across industries. Finally, the Commission may learn how to 
implement effective remedies in specific industries. To analyze these issues and offer a robustness 
check for assumptions 3 and 4, we define remedy-intensive industries, where we expect our 
predictions to be more precisely met. Table 13 presents our findings. 
[table 13 about here] 
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Results are again very much in line with our previous conclusions. Both for merging firms 
and rivals, prohibitions reverse rents generated around the merger announcement. The remedies’ 
effectiveness is substantially increased in remedy-intensive industries: All four slope coefficients 
have a negative sign (biO, biS), three of them are significant, and the sizes in absolute terms of the 
coefficients are much larger than in the full sample. This indicates substantial rent reversion and, 
according to our interpretation, suggests that the Commission might have learned over time and in 
certain industries to implement more effective remedies. 
6.4.7. Timely Merger  Decisions 
The timing of the Commission’s decision might convey additional information to the market, in 
which case our assumption 3 might be hurt. We claim that the tightly regulated merger control 
process should reduce this problem. We drop all cases where the decision came too early or too 
late with respect to the regulated deadline and re-estimate our model on the subsample of mergers 
for which there was a “timely decision”.38 Table 14 present our results. 
[table 14 about here] 
Our main results are reinforced. The slopes for blockings (biB) are not significantly different from 
minus one for rivals and merging firms. The slopes on remedies for merging firms (bMO, bMS) are 
(partially) significantly negative and larger in absolute value than in the full sample. The slope on 
structural remedies for rivals (bRS) is negative and significant, while that for behavioral remedies 
(bRO) is positive. Again, we interpret these findings as remedies being only partially effective. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper is a first attempt to provide a framework to econometrically assess the effectiveness of 
merger control decisions. We do this by using a simple, intuitive, and novel approach based on 
stock market data: By looking at the relation between firms’ abnormal returns around the two 
major event dates, the merger and antitrust decision announcements, we obtain several testable 
hypotheses. We try to be cautious in isolating the true effects of the antitrust decisions through 
event studies. First, we account for information leakages prior to major events. Second, we adjust 
our profitability measures for the market expectations about the merger control procedure by using 
a probability correction method. Third, our dataset is as “clean” as possible in identifying major 
rivals of merging firms, hence the merger’s true competitive effect, as our sources for market 
definition are the decisions of the European Commission itself. Fourth, we propose several 
robustness checks based on different types of mergers, industries, and time periods to control for 
the possible failure of our framework’s crucial assumptions. 
                                                 
38
 Excluding either only “early” or only “late” decisions leads to comparable results. 
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We find that outright prohibitions completely revert the rents generated around the merger 
announcement. Our interpretation of this finding is that they solve the anticompetitive concerns 
raised by the merger. This is also a consistency check for the reliability of our approach. Remedies, 
instead, do not seem to achieve this full rent reversion on average. We therefore interpret them as 
only partially effective. Yet, our methodology allows us to qualify this result in several directions. 
Remedies appear to be more effective in reverting rents generated at the merger announcement if 
they are ordered during the first investigation phase. This result, at first sight controversial, is in 
line with the empirical evidence provided by the ex-post evaluation study conducted by DG Comp 
(2005), which is based on a very different evaluation method. Remedies are mostly effective in 
phase 1 because these cases are simpler, remedies must be clear cut and easily implementable, and 
the Commission has a stronger bargaining power with respect to the merging firms through the 
credible threat of opening a costly phase 2 investigation. Moreover, remedies seem to be more 
effective if correctly applied to anticompetitive mergers.  
We find that rents following an outright clearance increase with the size of the merger 
announcement rents, but only for rivals. We interpret this result as a sign of the cost of possible 
type II errors, where anticompetitive deals are waved through. We provide three additional pieces 
of evidence confirming this interpretation. Finally we also offer insights about the evolution of 
European merger policy effectiveness over time. Apparently, the Commission has been able to 
learn over the years and from its past experience and has improved the effectiveness of its remedial 
action. Four main assumptions are the pillars on which our framework is funded. We run several 
robustness checks and show that our results are more in line with the predictions of our framework, 
when we focus on subsamples for which our maintained assumptions are more likely hold. We 
also show that running our test on subsamples where some of our assumptions are less likely to 
hold, does not seem to have a significant impact on our main findings. We therefore believe we 
have provided quite robust results on the effectiveness of European merger control. 
In recent years the EU Commission – in contrast to the U.S. antitrust authorities – 
increasingly hesitates to block mergers, especially after the European Court of Justice overruled 
several of its blocking decisions. Our results imply that this may be problematic: remedies might 
be a good policy tool, when the anticompetitive concerns brought by the merger are not too 
serious. In complex mergers, which create serious worries about the post-merger industry’s 
competitiveness, prohibitions might be the only tool capable of restoring effective competition. 
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Appendix 1. Event Study Methodology 
Under the assumptions of efficient markets and rational expectations, the market model predicts 
that firm f’s stock return at day t ( tfR , ) is proportional to a daily market return ( tmR , ): 
, , ,f t m t f tR Rc d g? - - . 
We estimate the market model over 240 trading days, starting 50 days prior to the announcement 
day and using the Scholes– and Williams (1977) method. Using the model’s parameters g and d, 
we predict what firm f’s stock price would have been, had the event under consideration (merger 
announcement or antitrust decision) not occurred, i.e. the abnormal returns are: 
tmtftftftf RRRRAR ,,,,,  
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ dc //?/? . 
With efficient markets abnormal returns have zero mean and a variance equal to: 
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where L is the estimation period length and mR  and m
2u  are respectively the mean and variance of 
the market portfolio. We then calculate the cumulative abnormal return over an event window 
(v1,v2): 
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To obtain the aggregate effects of the merger j on merging firms (i=M) and on rivals (i=R) 
around the events of interest, eijR , (e = A, D; announcement and decision), we take the weighted 
average of the cumulative abnormal returns of all firms in each of the two groups, the weight being 
firm f’s market value: 
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where Nij is the number of firms in class i involved in merger j. 
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Appendix 2. Accounting for  Market Expectations 
If markets are semi-strong efficient, they should account for the future antitrust decision when 
reacting to a merger announcement (e.g. Eckbo, 1992). We assume that the market builds 
expectations about the effect of the Commission’s decision d (clearance or action, which includes 
blockings and any kind of remedies), given the public information available in the market around 
the merger announcement (IA). When expectations are rational, the expected value of the 
Commission’s decision can be written as:  
] _ ] _ÂR?R
d
Aj
D
ijA
D
ij IdIE Pr      d= clear, action, 
where ] _Aj IdPr  is the probability assigned by the market to decision d given the information 
available around the merger’s announcement. 
The observed abnormal return for firms i around the announcement day ( AijR ) is then equal 
to the competitive effect of merger j for firms i ( *AijR ) minus the expected value of the effect of the 
Commission’s decision. Assuming that any effective action (remedies or blockings) effectively 
wipes out all market power profits accruing from the merger, i.e. *Aij
D
ij
a R/?R , and a clearance 
does not have any profitability effect, i.e. 0?R cDij , we can then write the following: 
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Therefore, the competitive effect of merger j on firms i is: 
] _* +AjAijAij Iaction/R?R 1Pr* ,   (A1) 
i.e. the measured announcement CAAR divided by the ex-ante probability that the merger will be 
cleared without conditions. The market can build a prior of this probability by using available 
information about the merger and the Commission’s records. This is what the econometrician can 
do by running a logit regression to assess the probability of clearance given the merger 
observables. 
Similarly, at the time of the Commission’s decision some new information hits the market. 
The first important date is the phase 1 decision. The phase 1 decision’s effect ( 1PijR ) is the 
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difference between the antitrust decision’s competitive effect on firm i ( *DijR ) and the market 
expectation about it. Likewise, if anticompetitive concerns are substantial and the Commission 
decides to open a phase 2 investigation, the market updates its beliefs about remedies.39 Therefore, 
the abnormal returns around the phase 1 decision ( 1PijR ) for mergers that go into a phase 2 
investigation should simply be the update of the market expectation about remedies, given the 
newer information set available at this point in time (IP1). Summarizing, the phase 1 effect is the 
following: 
] _ ] _* +
] _ ] _ÍÌ
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Ê
R/R
/R?R/R
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1 Pr1
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The competitive effect of the Commission’s decision for a case that does not go into phase 2 is 
thus: 
] _* +Aj
P
ijD
ij
IactionPr1
1
*
/
R?R .  (A2) 
Similarly for cases going into phase 2, around the phase 2 decision, the abnormal return 
( 2PijR ) should measure the difference between the competitive effect of a remedy in phase 2 and 
the expectation that the market built given the information available on the phase 1 decision 
] _ ] _ADijPijDijPDijDijPij IIE *1*1**2 E   R/R/R?R/R?R , i=M, R. Hence, the competitive effect of the 
Commission’s decision for cases that go into phase 2 is the sum of phase 1 and phase 2 effects 
weighted by the ex-ante probability of clearance: 
* + ] _* +AjPijPijDij IactionPr1/12* /R-R?R .  (A3) 
                                                 
39
 Indeed, when a case goes into phase 2, the probability of an antitrust intervention increases sharply. According to the 
European Commission’s statistics, the incidence of remedies in phase 1 is ca. 5%, while it increases to over 75% in 
phase 2. Moreover, a merger can be prohibited only after phase 2. 
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Appendix 3: Graphical Representation of Our  Framework 
Figure 3 should help to clarify our predictions in diagrams representing the announcement rents on 
the x-coordinate and the decision rents on the y-coordinate. In part a) we describe the prediction 
for rivals. Consider a merger 1, where efficiency and market power effects on rivals exactly cancel 
each other out (i.e. MP efficienciesR ? /R ), so that measured abnormal returns around the merger 
announcement are zero (point A1). If this merger is blocked, the decision’s effect on rivals should 
also be zero, since there is no net rent to be reversed. On the contrary, for this merger an effective 
remedy would rip out only the market power rents ( MP/R ), leading to a negative shift (i.e. 
intercept) due to the decision (movement to R1). Consider now the clearly anticompetitive merger 
2. The market power effect is larger than the efficiency effect, so the starting point is A2. If this 
merger is blocked, both the market power and the efficiency rents are reversed: we move down to 
B2, by the amount of the net effect ( )MP efficiencies/ R -R . In the case of remedies, an effective 
decision takes away the market power effect still maintaining the efficiency effect. So we move 
further down to point R2. By tracing out all possible mergers, we get the predicted regression lines 
for the case of prohibitions and effective remedies. In the former, the slope is equal to -1; in the 
latter, it is still negative but less steep than -1. 40 
[figure 3 about here] 
In part b) we describe the situation for the merging firms. First, notice that here the origin 
represents a merger that has neither a market power nor an efficiency effect on merging firms’ 
profitability. Furthermore, in this case an effective action should not take away any rent since the 
merger does not create any. Therefore, both regression lines for remedies and prohibitions should 
run through the origin. We now consider merger 1 again, which has a positive announcement 
effect consisting of the sum of the positive market power rents ( MPR ) and the positive rents due to 
increased efficiency ( esefficienciR ). The starting point is therefore A1. If this merger is blocked, both 
kinds of rents are destroyed and we move down to point B1. If effective remedies are imposed, 
only the market power rents are ripped out by the antitrust action and we move down to point R1. 
The same mechanism applies to merger 2. As with rivals, we observe for the merging firms, too, 
that in the case of blocking the slope of the regression line should be -1, while in the case of 
remedies it should be negative yet, in absolute terms, smaller then -1.41 
                                                 
40
 The negative slope hinges on the assumption that the anticompetitive effect monotonically increases with the net-
effect, i.e. that anticompetitive and efficiency effects are not perfectly negatively correlated. 
41
 In figure 3b, we blanked out the possibility of non-profitable mergers. The fact that mergers happen which reduce 
the efficiency and profits of merging firms cannot be well explained by standard industrial organization models (for an 
exception, see Fridolfsson and Stennek, 2005). Nevertheless, there is overwhelming evidence that these managerial 
mergers do take place (see e.g. Gugler et al., 2003). Predictions for an effective merger control in this case are difficult 
to spell out. 
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Figure 2: The EU Merger  Control Process 
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Figure 3: Effective merger  control 
 
a) Rivals 
 
  
 
 
b) Merging firms 
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Table 1. Effective Merger  Control 
 
Predictions  
Rivals (i=R) Merging firms (i=M) 
Blocking (d=B) aRB = 0, bRB = -1 aMB = 0, bMB = -1 
Remedies (d=O, S, R) 
aRO < 0, aRS < 0, aRR < 0 
bRO < 0, bRS < 0, bRR < 0 
aMO = 0, aMS = 0, aMR = 0 
bMO < 0, bMS < 0, bMR < 0 
Clearance (d=C) aRC = 0, bRC = 0 aMC = 0, bMC = 0 
Note: aid denotes the intercepts and bid the slope coefficients (i=M, R and d=C,O,S,B). First 
subscript: M for merging firms and R for rivals. Second subscripts: B for Blocking; O for Other 
remedies; S for Structural remedies; C for outright Clearance. In some specifications, we do not 
differentiate between structural and other remedies due to the lack of observations. Hence, we 
use the subscript R for Remedies in these cases. 
 
Table 2. Preliminary Statistics 
 Descr iption Obs Mean Min Max
mvm Market value of merging firms in million US $ 151 44165 10.8 607975
mvr Market value of rivals (average) in million US $ 151 7492 3.6 227604
ncomp Number of competitors mentioned in the Commission report 151 7.59 1 34 
ncomp_list Percentage of mentioned competitors listed in the stock market 151 0.63 0 1 
full Full acquisition 151 0.57 0 1 
partial Partial acquisition 151 0.13 0 1 
JV Joint Venture 151 0.24 0 1 
asset Asset acquisition 151 0.06 0 1 
tender Tender offer 151 0.11 0 1 
conglom Conglomerate or vertical concerns have been identified 151 0.15 0 1 
crossbord Cross-border deal 151 0.69 0 1 
us One or both of the merging firms stem from the USA 151 0.33 0 1 
bigeu One or both of the merging firms stem from a major EU country 
(France, Germany, Italy, Spain, or the UK) 151 0.68 0 1 
phase1 The merger was cleared in phase 1 151 0.54 0 1 
phase2 The merger was cleared in phase 2 151 0.46 0 1 
EU The geographical market is the European Economic Area 151 0.41 0 1 
World The geographical market is worldwide 151 0.21 0 1 
ACTION An action (remedies or blocking) has been taken 151 0.43 0 1 
BLOCK The merger was prohibited 151 0.08 0 1 
STRUCTURAL The remedy consisted of a divestiture 151 0.23 0 1 
OTHER Other kinds of remedies 151 0.12 0 1 
  
  40
Table 3: Abnormal Returns to Merging Firms and Their  Rivals for  Var ious Events, 
Windows and Decisions 
  Merging firms Rivals 
  
  Shor t run Long run  Shor t run Long run 
 Nobs CAAR (5,5) S.E. 
CAAR 
(50,5) S.E. Nobs
CAAR 
(5,5) St.E. 
CAAR 
(50,5) St.E. 
At announcement of the merger :            
 151 
  0.010** 0.005  0.018 ** 0.010 151  -0.003 0.003  0.004 0.008
At phase 1 decision of the merger :a           
Cleared in phase 1 71  -0.002 0.007  0.003 0.010 71  -0.002 0.005  0.008 0.009
Cleared with remedies in phase 1 10   0.013 0.024 -0.007 0.033 10 
 -0.035* 0.020  0.032 0.066
Going to phase 2 70 
 -0.017*** 0.006 -0.014** 0.008 70  -0.0001 0.005 -0.011 0.009
All 151 
 -0.008** 0.004 -0.005 0.006 151  -0.003 0.003  0.000 0.007
At phase 2 decision of the merger :           
Cleared in phase 2 16    0.018 0.019
 0.066** 0.037 16   0.001 0.010  0.001 0.022
Cleared with remedies in phase 2 41    0.003 0.012 -0.015 0.015 41  -0.004 0.008 -0.017 0.029
Blocked 13    0.008 0.009  0.008 0.049 13   0.025 0.025 -0.055 0.045
All 70    0.007 0.008  0.005 0.015 70   0.001 0.007 -0.019 0.348
Note: *, **, *** ... significant at 10%, 5%, 1%. 
a
 For the phase 1 decisions the long-run window is (25,5). 
 
Table 4: The Probability of Action 
 Coef. Std. Er r  
us -1.314** 0.540 
bigeu -0.419 0.480 
conglom  0.955* 0.568 
crossbord -0.476 0.459 
world -0.418 0.519 
eu -0.844* 0.482 
full  0.781* 0.421 
lmvm  0.121 0.165 
lmvr  0.183** 0.151 
d  1.034** 0.508 
i  0.673 0.637 
trend -0.949 0.611 
d95_02  1.729* 0.921 
constant -2.452 1.688 
Nobs 151 
Pseudo R2 0.156 
Correctly classified               69.48% 
Log-likelihood -88.80 
Note: The dependent variable, ACTION, is equal to 1 if the merger was cleared 
with remedies or blocked. us is equal to 1 if one of the merging firms stems from 
the USA; bigeu is equal to 1 if one of the merging firms stems from a big EU 
country (Germany, France, UK or Italy); conglom is equal to 1 if conglomerate or 
vertical effects are also present; crossbord is equal to 1 if the merger is a cross-
border deal; world is equal to 1 if the EU Commission defines the relevant 
geographic market worldwide; eu is equal to 1 if relevant market is EU wide; full 
equal to 1 if the merger is a full merger; lmvm and lmvr are respectively the size of 
merging and rival firms measured by the logarithm of market values; d is equal to 
1 if manufacturing sector; i is equal to 1 if communications sector; trend represents 
a time trend; d95_02 equal to 1 if the merger was scrutinized during 1995-2002. 
The symbols *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively  
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Table 5: Regression Results for  Equation (1) 
 
Dependent var iable: Probability 
Corrected Decision CAAR, D* Rivals (i=R)  Merging Firms (i=M) 
Single 
Tests H0  
Single 
Tests H0 
 Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values)  Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values) 
CLEAR (aiC)  0.042 0.061 
H0: aRC=0 
0.494  -0.020 0.093 
H0: aMC=0 
0.832 
OTHER REMEDIES (aiO)  0.013 0.037 
H0: aRO ~ 0 
0.420  -0.095 0.056 
H0: aMO ~ 0 
0.826 
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES (aiS)  0.049 0.028 
H0: aRS ~ 0 
0.233  -0.033 0.045 
H0: aMS ~ 0 
0.626 
BLOCK (aiB) -0.061 0.041 
H0: aRB=0 
0.410  -0.213 0.063 
H0: aMB=0 
0.062 
CLEAR * RA* (biC)  0.274 0.076 
H0: bRC=0 
0.000   0.007 0.090 
H0: bMC=0 
0.940 
OTHER REMEDIES* RA* (biO) -0.116 0.093 
H0: bRO ~ 0 
0.893  -0.341 0.172 
H0: bMO ~ 0 
0.975 
STRUCTURAL REM.*RA* (biS) -0.105 0.091 
H0: bRS ~ 0 
0.874  -0.165 0.077 
H0: bMS ~ 0 
0.983 
BLOCK* RA* (biB) -0.875 0.100 
H0: bRB =-1 
0.211  -0.718 0.136 
H0: bMB =-1 
0.040 
Nobs 151  151 
R2 0.539  0.325 
Note: We use the Huber–White sandwich estimator for robust standard errors. We control for industry effects, for 
conglomerate/foreclosure aspects, and for the proportion of rivals that we lost due to data limitation. CLEAR: the 
merger is cleared without remedies; OTHER REMEDIES: the merger is cleared with remedies other than divestitures 
(mainly behavioral remedies); STRUCTURAL REMEDIES: the merger is cleared with a divestiture; BLOCK the 
merger is blocked. We report the p-value for the tested hypotheses. Figures in bold represent estimates which are 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level at least. 
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Table 6: Phase 1 vs. Phase 2 
 
Dependent var iable: Probability 
Corrected Decision CAAR, D* Rivals (i=R)  Merging Firms (i=M) 
 
 
Phase 1 
Single Tests 
H0  
Single Tests 
H0 
 Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values)  Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values) 
CLEAR (aiC)  0.075 0.031 
H0: aRC=0  
0.018  -0.025 0.055 
H0: aMC=0  
0.659 
REMEDIES (aiR)  0.020 0.023 
H0: aRR ~ 0 
0.305  -0.018 0.040 
H0: aMR ~ 0 
0.602 
CLEAR * RA* (biC)  0.232 0.033 
H0: bRC=0 
0.000   0.029 0.046 
H0: bMC=0 
0.525 
REMEDIES* RA* (biR) -0.190 0.054 
H0: bRR ~ 0 
0.999   0.010 0.080 
H0: bMR ~ 0 
0.450 
Nobs 80  80 
R2 0.650   0.249 
 
 
Phase 2 
Single Tests 
H0  
Single Tests 
H0 
 Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values)  Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values) 
CLEAR (aiC) -0.035 0.246 
H0: aRC=0  
0.889   0.272 0.319 
H0: aMC =0  
0.397 
OTHER REMEDIES (aiO) -0.050 0.103 
H0: aRO ~ 0 
0.588   0.069 0.159 
H0: aMO ~ 0 
0.401 
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES (aiS)  0.090 0.089 
H0: aRS ~ 0 
0.353   0.207 0.132 
H0: aMS ~ 0 
0.255 
BLOCK (aiB) -0.020 0.105 
H0: aRB=0  
0.934   0.205 0.151 
H0: aMB=0  
0.526 
CLEAR * RA* (biC)  0.199 0.462 
H0: bRC =0 
0.668   0.158 0.708 
H0: bMC=0 
0.825 
OTHER REMEDIES* RA* (biO)  0.042 0.503 
H0: bRO ~ 0 
0.467  -0.823 0.545 
H0: bMO ~ 0 
0.931 
STRUCTURAL REM.*"RA* (biS)  0.531 0.177 
H0: bRS ~ 0 
0.002  -0.217 0.149 
H0: bMS ~ 0 
0.924 
BLOCK* RA* (biB) -0.714 0.196 
H0: bRB =-1 
0.151  -0.782 0.244 
H0: bMB =-1 
0.377 
Nobs 71  71 
R2 0.570   0.474 
Note: We use the Huber–White sandwich estimator for robust standard errors. We control for industry effects, for 
conglomerate/foreclosure aspects, and for the proportion of rivals that we lost due to data limitation. CLEAR: the 
merger is cleared without remedies; OTHER REMEDIES: the merger is cleared with remedies other than 
divestitures (mainly behavioral remedies); STRUCTURAL REMEDIES: the merger is cleared with a divestiture; 
BLOCK the merger is blocked. We report the p-value for the tested hypotheses. Figures in bold represent estimates 
which are significantly different from zero at the 10% level at least. 
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Table 7: Pro- vs. Anticompetitive mergers 
 
Dependent var iable: Probability 
Corrected Decision CAAR, D* Rivals (i=R)  Merging Firms (i=M) 
 Full Sample 
Single 
Tests H0  
Single 
Tests H0 
 Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values)  Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values) 
CLEAR*ANTICOMP (aiC)  0.015 0.040 
H0: aRC=0  
0.834   0.031 0.041 
H0: aMC=0  
0.721 
CLEAR*PROCOMP (aiC)  0.035 0.064 
H0: aRC=0 
0.590   0.018 0.081 
H0: aMC=0 
0.825 
REMEDIES*ANTICOMP (aiR)  0.081 0.052 
H0: aRR ~ 0 
0.150  -0.043 0.047 
H0: aMR ~ 0 
0.685 
REMEDIES*PROCOMP (aiR)  0.021 0.044 
H0: aRR ~ 0 
0.387   0.011 0.044 
H0: aMR ~ 0 
0.450 
BLOCK (aiB) -0.066 0.048 
H0: aRB=0  
0.389  -0.257 0.058 
H0: aMB=0  
0.010 
CLEAR*ANTICOMP* RA*(biC)  0.352 0.172 
H0: bRC=0 
0.043  -0.226 0.123 
H0: bMC=0 
0.067 
CLEAR*PROCOMP* RA*(biC)  0.193 0.127 
H0: bRC=0 
0.129   0.020 0.105 
H0: bMC=0 
0.847 
REMEDIES*ANTICOMP* RA(biR)* -0.302 0.166 
H0: bRR ~ 0 
0.964  -0.059 0.071 
H0: bMR ~ 0 
0.797 
REMEDIES*PROCOMP* RA*(biR) -0.089 0.122 
H0: bRR ~ 0 
0.767  -0.695 0.119 
H0: bMR ~ 0 
0.999 
BLOCK* RA*(biB) -0.867 0.104 
H0: bRB =-1 
0.201  -0.763 0.118 
H0: bMB =-1 
0.047 
Nobs 151  151 
R2 0.497   0.469 
Note: We use the Huber–White sandwich estimator for robust standard errors. We control for industry effects, for 
conglomerate/foreclosure aspects, and for the proportion of rivals that we lost due to data limitation. CLEAR: the 
merger is cleared without remedies; OTHER REMEDIES: the merger is cleared with remedies other than 
divestitures (mainly behavioral remedies); STRUCTURAL REMEDIES: the merger is cleared with a divestiture; 
BLOCK the merger is blocked. We report the p-value for the tested hypotheses. Figures in bold represent estimates 
which are significantly different from zero at the 10% level at least. ANTICOMP is equal to one if rivals’ 
announcement CAARs > 0 ( * 0ARjR @ ); PROCOMP is equal to one if rivals’ announcement CAARs < 0 ( 0* >RARj ). 
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Table 8: Robustness Check of Assumption 1: Pure Hor izontal Mergers 
Dependent var iable: Probability 
Corrected Decision CAAR, D* Rivals (i=R)  Merging Firms (i=M) 
 Pure Hor izontal 
Single 
Tests H0  
Single 
Tests H0 
 Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values)  Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values) 
CLEAR (aiC) -0.027 0.073 
H0: aRC=0 
0.715   0.023 0.087 
H0: aMC=0 
0.790 
OTHER REMEDIES (aiO) -0.119 0.045 
H0: aRO ~ 0 
0.941  -0.097 0.054 
H0: aMO ~ 0 
0.854 
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES (aiS) -0.001 0.033 
H0: aRS ~ 0 
0.506   0.031 0.042 
H0: aMS ~ 0 
0.372 
BLOCK (aiB) -0.102 0.050 
H0: aRB=0  
0.251   0.242 0.059 
H0: aMB=0  
0.022 
CLEAR * RA* (biC)  0.235 0.095 
H0: bRC=0 
0.015  -0.096 0.089 
H0: bMC=0 
0.286 
OTHER REMEDIES* RA* (biO)  0.886 0.169 
H0: bRO ~ 0 
0.000  -0.365 0.175 
H0: bMO ~ 0 
0.980 
STRUCTURAL REM.*"RA* (biS) -0.077 0.106 
H0: bRS ~ 0 
0.765   0.061 0.109 
H0: bMS ~ 0 
0.288 
BLOCK* RA* (biB) -0.865 0.134 
H0: bRB =-1 
0.315  -1.325 0.136 
H0: bMB =-1 
0.018 
Nobs 129  129 
R2 0.560   0.570 
Note: We use the Huber–White sandwich estimator for robust standard errors. We control for industry effects, for 
conglomerate/foreclosure aspects, and for the proportion of rivals that we lost due to data limitation. We report the 
p-value for the tested hypotheses. Figures in bold represent estimates which are significantly different from zero at 
the 10% level at least. Pure hor izontal mergers are those for which the Commission identified only horizontal 
effects and no conglomerate or vertical effects 
Table 9: Robustness Check of Assumption 2: Using the official announcement dates  
Dependent var iable: Probability 
Corrected Decision CAAR, RD* Rivals  Merging Firms 
  
Single 
Tests H0  
Single 
Tests H0 
 Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values)  Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values) 
CLEAR (aiC) 0.200 0.114 
H0: aRC=0 
0.082  0.007 0.118 
H0: aMC=0 
0.703 
OTHER REMEDIES (aiO) -0.106 0.113 
H0: aRO ~ 0 
0.826  -0.129 0.135 
H0: aMO ~ 0 
0.564 
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES (aiS) 0.155 0.122 
H0: aRS ~ 0 
0.103  -0.052 0.094 
H0: aMS ~ 0 
0.999 
BLOCK (aiB) -0.009 0.149 
H0: aRB ~ 0 
0.523  
 
-0.473 0.320 
H0: aMB =0 
0.926 
CLEAR * RA* (biC) 0.303 0.054 
H0: bRC=0 
0.000  0.008 0.098 
H0: bMC=0 
0.830 
OTHER REMEDIES* RA* (biO) 0.054 0.086 
H0: bRO ~ 0 
0.264  0.246 0.089 
H0: bMO ~ 0 
0.004 
STRUCTURAL REM.*"RA* (biS) -0.218 0.253 
H0: bRS ~ 0 
0.805  -0.168 0.187 
H0: bMS ~ 0 
0.414 
BLOCK* RA* (biB) -0.939 0.243 
H0: bRB =-1 
0.803  -0.887 0.800 
H0: bMB =-1 
0.256 
Nobs 120  120 
R2 0.38   0.36 
Note: We control for industry effects, for conglomerate/foreclosure aspects, and for the proportion of rivals that 
we lost due to data limitation. We report the p-value for the tested hypotheses. Figures in bold represent 
estimates which are significantly different from zero at the 10% level at least. The official announcement is 
defined according to the SDC database (Thomson Reuters). We use the Huber-White sandwich estimator for 
robust standard errors. 
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Table 10: Robustness Check of Assumption 2: Post-1996 
Dependent var iable: Probability 
Corrected Decision CAAR, D* Rivals (i=R)  Merging Firms (i=M) 
 Post 1996 
Single 
Tests H0  
Single 
Tests H0 
 Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values)  Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values) 
CLEAR (aiC)  0.022 0.066 
H0: aRC=0 
0.743   0.072 0.081 
H0: aMC=0 
0.378 
OTHER REMEDIES (aiO) -0.027 0.066 
H0: aRO ~ 0 
0.625  -0.042 0.079 
H0: aMO ~ 0 
0.661 
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES (aiS)  0.031 0.045 
H0: aRS ~ 0 
0.340   0.020 0.056 
H0: aMS ~ 0 
0.413 
BLOCK (aiB) -0.066 0.069 
H0: aRB ~ 0 
0.464  -0.481 0.079 
H0: aMB=0  
0.000 
CLEAR * RA* (biC)  0.252 0.111 
H0: bRC=0 
0.026  -0.008 0.106 
H0: bMC=0 
0.942 
OTHER REMEDIES* RA* (biO) -0.106 0.136 
H0: bRO ~ 0 
0.781  -0.338 0.192 
H0: bMO ~ 0 
0.959 
STRUCTURAL REM.*"RA* (biS)  0.395 0.132 
H0: bRS ~ 0 
0.002  -0.185 0.089 
H0: bMS ~ 0 
0.980 
BLOCK* RA* (biB) -0.843 0.178 
H0: bRB =-1 
0.379  -0.687 0.152 
H0: bMB =-1 
0.042 
Nobs 104  104 
R2 0.418   0.476 
Note: We use the Huber–White sandwich estimator for robust standard errors. We control for industry effects, for 
conglomerate/foreclosure aspects, and for the proportion of rivals that we lost due to data limitation. We report the 
p-value for the tested hypotheses. Figures in bold represent estimates which are significantly different from zero at 
the 10% level at least. The post-1996 period includes the years 1996-2002, i.e. the years of the economy-wide 
merger wave. 
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Table 11: Robustness Check of Assumptions 1 & 2: " Active"  vs. " Inactive"  Industr ies 
Dependent var iable: Probability 
Corrected Decision CAAR, D* Rivals (i=R)  Merging Firms (i=M) 
 Active 
Single 
Tests H0  
Single 
Tests H0 
 Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values)  Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values) 
CLEAR (aiC) 0.109 0.074 
H0: aRC=0 
0.146  0.076 0.127 
H0: aMC=0 
0.554 
OTHER REMEDIES (aiO) -0.120 0.138 
H0: aRO ~ 0 
0.805  0.025 0.161 
H0: aMO ~ 0 
0.876 
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES (aiS) 0.099 0.106 
H0: aRS ~ 0 
0.178  0.043 0.175 
H0: aMS ~ 0 
0.403 
BLOCK (aiB) 0.113 0.101 
H0: aRB ~ 0 
0.268  -0.079 0.319 
H0: aMB ~ 0 
0.805 
CLEAR * RA* (biC) 0.201 0.103 
H0: bRC=0 
0.057  -0.209 0.104 
H0: bMC=0 
0.050 
OTHER REMEDIES* RA* (biO) 0.561 0.530 
H0: bRO ~ 0 
0.147  -0.461 0.458 
H0: bMO ~ 0 
0.841 
STRUCTURAL REM.*"RA* (biS) -0.069 0.270 
H0: bRS ~ 0 
0.600  -0.190 0.363 
H0: bMS ~ 0 
0.698 
BLOCK* RA* (biB) -0.654 0.273 
H0: bRB =-1 
0.210  -0.912 0.225 
H0: bMB =-1 
0.696 
Nobs 75  75 
R2 0.333   0.433 
 Inactive 
Single 
Tests H0  
Single 
Tests H0 
 Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values)  Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values) 
CLEAR (aiC) 0.322 0.116 
H0: aRC=0 
0.008  0.197 0.125 
H0: aMC=0 
0.200 
OTHER REMEDIES (aiO) 0.176 0.140 
H0: aRO ~ 0 
0.107  0.036 0.170 
H0: aMO ~ 0 
0.107 
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES (aiS) 0.279 0.132 
H0: aRS ~ 0 
0.020  0.115 0.124 
H0: aMS ~ 0 
0.177 
BLOCK (aiB) 0.196 0.071 
H0: aRB=0  
0.008  0.188 0.181 
H0: aMB=0  
0.399 
CLEAR * RA* (biC) 0.008 0.217 
H0: bRC=0 
0.970  0.347 0.122 
H0: bMC=0 
0.230 
OTHER REMEDIES* RA* (biO) 0.273 0.280 
H0: bRO ~ 0 
0.168  -0.155 0.154 
H0: bMO ~ 0 
0.721 
STRUCTURAL REM.*"RA* (biS) -0.022 0.564 
H0: bRS ~ 0 
0.515  -0.053 0.086 
H0: bMS ~ 0 
0.901 
BLOCK* RA* (biB) -0.651 0.209 
H0: bRB =-1 
0.101  -0.686 0.388 
H0: bMB =-1 
0.073 
Nobs 76  76 
R2 0.433   0.520 
Note: We use the Huber–White sandwich estimator for robust standard errors. We control for industry effects, for 
conglomerate/foreclosure aspects, and for the proportion of rivals that we lost due to data limitation. We report 
the p-value for the tested hypotheses. Figures in bold represent estimates which are significantly different from 
zero at the 10% level at least. The subsample of "inactive (active) industr ies" is defined by those cases for 
which the future merger growth rate by 2-digit NACE in the following two years is lower (larger) than 12% (the 
median values). We use the full population of more than 3,500 notified EU mergers for this definition. 
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 Table 12: Robustness Check of Assumption 2: " Speedy"  versus " slow"  mergers 
Dependent var iable: Probability 
Corrected Decision CAAR, D* Rivals (i=R)  Merging firms (i=M) 
 Speedy 
Single 
Tests H0  
Single 
Tests H0 
 Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values)  Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values) 
CLEAR (aiC) 0.079 0.090 
H0: aRC=0 
0.385  -0.021 0.103 
H0: aMC=0 
0.839 
OTHER REMEDIES (aiO) 0.039 0.133 
H0: aRO ~ 0 
0.385  -0.060 0.139 
H0: aMO ~ 0 
0.669 
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES (aiS) 0.062 0.129 
H0: aRS ~ 0 
0.402  -0.019 0.126 
H0: aMS ~ 0 
0.561 
BLOCK (aiB) 0.063 0.135 
H0: aRB ~ 0 
0.645  -0.464 0.303 
H0: aMB ~ 0 
0.131 
CLEAR * RA* (biC) 0.164 0.127 
H0: bRC=0 
0.201  0.120 0.092 
H0: bMC=0 
0.197 
OTHER REMEDIES* RA* (biO) -0.281 0.224 
H0: bRO ~ 0 
0.892  -0.623 0.303 
H0: bMO ~ 0 
0.044 
STRUCTURAL REM.*"RA* (biS) 0.188 0.761 
H0: bRS ~ 0 
0.402  -0.179 0.067 
H0: bMS ~ 0 
0.995 
BLOCK* RA* (biB) -1.034 0.153 
H0: bRB =-1 
0.827  -2.222 0.704 
H0: bMB =-1 
0.221 
Nobs 75  75 
R2 0.510   0.570 
 Slow 
Single 
Tests H0  
Single 
Tests H0 
 Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values)  Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values) 
CLEAR (aiC) 0.210 0.155 
H0: aRC=0 
0.180  0.055 0.111 
H0: aMC=0 
0.622 
OTHER REMEDIES (aiO) -0.190 0.125 
H0: aRO ~ 0 
0.934  -0.159 0.147 
H0: aMO ~ 0 
0.286 
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES (aiS) 0.125 0.163 
H0: aRS ~ 0 
0.223  0.027 0.135 
H0: aMS ~ 0 
0.423 
BLOCK (aiB) 0.134 0.177 
H0: aRB=0  
0.452  0.029 0.210 
H0: aMB=0  
0.891 
CLEAR * RA* (biC) 0.193 0.141 
H0: bRC=0 
0.178  0.012 0.251 
H0: bMC=0 
0.188 
OTHER REMEDIES* RA* (biO) 0.721 0.174 
H0: bRO ~ 0 
0.000  -0.063 0.294 
H0: bMO ~ 0 
0.585 
STRUCTURAL REM.*"RA* (biS) -0.117 0.430 
H0: bRS ~ 0 
0.606  -0.234 0.325 
H0: bMS ~ 0 
0.762 
BLOCK* RA* (biB) -0.444 0.245 
H0: bRB =-1 
0.027  -0.829 0.196 
H0: bMB =-1 
0.388 
Nobs 76  76 
R2 0.416   0.481 
Note: We use the Huber–White/ sandwich estimator for robust standard errors. We control for industry effects, 
for conglomerate/foreclosure aspects, and for the proportion of rivals that we lost due to data limitation. We 
report the p-value for the tested hypotheses. Figures in bold represent estimates which are significantly different 
from zero at the 10% level at least. " Speedy"  (“slow”) mergers are cases for which the distance between the 
first rumors about the merger and its notification is lower (larger) than 55 days (the median). 
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Table 13: Robustness Check of Assumptions 3 and 4: Remedy-intensive Industr ies 
Dependent var iable: Probability 
Corrected Decision CAAR, D* Rivals (i=R)  Merging Firms (i=M) 
 Remedy-Intensive Industr ies 
Single 
Tests H0  
Single 
Tests H0 
 Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values)  Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values) 
CLEAR (aiC)  0.000 0.186 
H0: aRC=0 
0.998   0.100 0.126 
H0: aMC=0 
0.429 
OTHER REMEDIES (aiO) -0.046 0.065 
H0: aRO ~ 0 
0.592   0.031 0.077 
H0: aMO ~ 0 
0.415 
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES (aiS)  0.011 0.051 
H0: aRS ~ 0 
0.477   0.084 0.062 
H0: aMS ~ 0 
0.250 
BLOCK (aiB) -0.097 0.075 
H0: aRB ~ 0 
0.625   0.276 0.097 
H0: aMB ~ 0 
0.059 
CLEAR * RA* (biC) 0.441 0.170 
H0: bRC=0 
0.012  -0.148 0.143 
H0: bMC=0 
0.304 
OTHER REMEDIES* RA* (biO) -0.193 0.133 
H0: bRO ~ 0 
0.924  -0.564 0.223 
H0: bMO ~ 0 
0.993 
STRUCTURAL REM.*"RA* (biS) -0.533 0.162 
H0: bRS ~ 0 
0.999  -0.193 0.087 
H0: bMS ~ 0 
0.985 
BLOCK* RA* (biB) -0.837 0.161 
H0: bRB =-1 
0.315  -1.514 0.302 
H0: bMB =-1 
0.094 
Nobs 81  81 
R2 0.590  0.587 
Note: We use the Huber–White sandwich estimator for robust standard errors. We control for industry effects, 
for conglomerate/foreclosure aspects, and for the proportion of rivals that we lost due to data limitation. We 
report the p-value for the tested hypotheses. Figures in bold represent estimates which are significantly different 
from zero at the 10% level at least. In remedy-intensive industries, defined at the two digit NACE code, the 
Commission imposed remedies including prohibitions in more than 10% of the mergers (i.e. the median). We use 
the full population of more than 3,500 notified EU mergers for this definition. 
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Table 14: Robustness Check of Assumption 3: Timely Decisions 
Dependent var iable: Probability 
Corrected Decision CAAR, D* Rivals (i=R)  Merging Firms (i=M) 
 Timely Decisions 
Single 
Tests H0  
Single 
Tests H0 
 Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values)  Coeff 
Robust 
S.E. (p-values) 
CLEAR (aiC) 0.005 0.065 
H0: aRC=0 
0.943  0.069 0.066 
H0: aMC=0 
0.301 
OTHER REMEDIES (aiO) -0.263 0.176 
H0: aRO ~ 0 
0.931  -0.021 0.082 
H0: aMO ~ 0 
0.604 
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES (aiS) 0.025 0.091 
H0: aRS ~ 0 
0.394  0.031 0.084 
H0: aMS ~ 0 
0.358 
BLOCK (aiB) -0.196 0.163 
H0: aRB ~ 0 
0.625  -0.092 0.237 
H0: aMB ~ 0 
0.703 
CLEAR * RA* (biC) 0.183 0.067 
H0: bRC=0 
0.008  0.027 0.088 
H0: bMC=0 
0.757 
OTHER REMEDIES* RA* (biO) 0.954 0.676 
H0: bRO ~ 0 
0.081  -0.555 0.360 
H0: bMO ~ 0 
0.937 
STRUCTURAL REM.*"RA* (biS) -0.577 0.286 
H0: bRS ~ 0 
0.976  -0.110 0.089 
H0: bMS ~ 0 
0.891 
BLOCK* RA* (biB) -1.007 0.104 
H0: bRB =-1 
0.945  -1.655 1.715 
H0: bMB =-1 
0.094 
Nobs 110  110 
R2 0.4605  0.2273 
Note: We use the Huber–White sandwich estimator for robust standard errors. We control for industry effects, for 
conglomerate/foreclosure aspects, and for the proportion of rivals that we lost due to data limitation. We report the 
p-value for the tested hypotheses. Figures in bold represent estimates which are significantly different from zero at 
the 10% level at least. “Timely decisions” are decisions made according to the deadlines prescribed by the 
merger regulation. We exclude “early” and “late” decisions. The former are cases where the commission made its 
decision 5 (25) days before the deadline in phase 1 (2), while the latter are cases where the decisions comes 5 (10) 
days after the deadline in phase I (2). 
